

ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICES
IN EUROPE

SURVEY IN 16
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

ANDRÁS KOVÁCS AND
GYÖRGY FISCHER

BUDAPEST, 2021



IPSOS SA



INSPIRA LTD HUNGARY



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1. INTRODUCTION

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The research, initiated by the Action and Protection League and carried out by the polling companies Ipsos and Inspira, aims to provide a comprehensive picture of anti-Semitic prejudice in 16 countries in the European Union.

Before presenting and analysing the research results, it is worth briefly discussing what such research examines. Researchers of the millennial history of antisemitic prejudice, “two thousand years of hatred,” have often pointed out that although antisemitism has been present in Western civilizations since ancient times, it has only from time to time become a major determinant of historical, social and political events.

Publications about modern antisemitism detail the reasons for the emergence of an antisemitic culture and language in certain ages and societies. This language has often been used by a significant part of society to “understand” and explain economic, social, political and cultural phenomena, such as f.e. economic crises or serious epidemics, which are difficult to understand, and which often have serious consequences for the whole so-

ciety. There is also significant literature on how political actors have used antisemitic language for mobilization and to achieve their political goals.

The term antisemitism refers to the end product of the process by which anti-Jewish prejudices in certain segments of society become an antisemitic culture and social and political actors appear who exploit this culture for political purposes. Namely, anti-Jewish prejudice develops into language, culture, ideology and finally politics – thus turning into an “ism”.

The current research does not examine antisemitism in the above sense. Although the term antisemitism will be used many times for the researched phenomenon, the subject of this research is not the entire process of becoming an “ism”, in the sense of analysing how antisemitic culture and subsequently antisemitic politics develop from anti-Jewish prejudices.

Our study addresses only the first phase of this process. Using empirical social research tools, it seeks to explore the prevalence and intensity of anti-Jewish prejudices in European societies, this necessary but not sufficient precondition for the development of antisemitism as worldview and political ideology. Our intention is to show how likely it is that in times of crisis, large social groups will be susceptible to the use of antisemitic language in their interpretation of perceived social conflicts and how much they are expected to listen to the message of antisemitic political entrepreneurs, that is, to see the solution to their problems in antisemitic politics.

Many in Europe today are concerned about the rise in violence against Jews, which clearly raises fears in Jewish communities on the Continent. It is common to expect prejudice research to explain this phenomenon, to explore which countries are par-

ticularly dangerous for the Jews living there and where the sources of anti-Jewish violence exist within a society. However, prejudice research is not suitable for answering these questions. There is a broad consensus in the scientific literature on prejudice that there is no direct link between pre-udice and the propensity for discrimination and violence against the prejudiced group. Frightening antisemitic violence can also upset the peace of societies in which there are relatively few antisemites, but a determined antisemitic minority, be they Islamists or far-right supporters or far-left terrorists, chooses violence as a tool for political action. On the other hand, it is also possible that in a society widely infected with anti-Jewish prejudice, the number of antisemitic atrocities is negligible because it does not include a tradition of political and

social violence and antisemites use other means, if any at all, against the target of their prejudices in practice. Therefore, if a survey shows a high level of support for antisemitic prejudices somewhere, it does not yet follow that the number of violent acts against Jews in that society will also be high. Such research can at most aspire to point at the groups of a given society whose members even if they do not tend to commit or support violent antisemitic acts, they often “understand” or at least do not strongly convict their perpetrators, thus creating an atmosphere that facilitates potential perpetrators on the path to violence. Our research can provide information about the proportion of people with antisemitic prejudices in the societies surveyed, but it may not be concluded which countries are particularly dangerous for the Jews living there.

2. MEASURING ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE

According to the widely accepted definition¹ of contemporary antisemitic prejudice, antisemitic prejudices today most often appear in three forms. The first form consists of a series of traditional stereotypes about Jews that have long been present in society; these are stereotypes that attribute unfavourable characteristics to Jews and are suitable for expressing hatred of Jews. The second manifestation is the denial of the fact, extent, methods or intentionality of genocide – the Holocaust

– committed against the Jews (also often referred to as secondary antisemitism). Finally, the third form of expression is the voicing or acceptance of anti-Israel views that go beyond the generally accepted limits of political criticism wherein Israel is condemned for certain acts never attributed to other states and unjust and condemnatory statements about the Jewish state are extrapolated to all Jews.

In our research, we sought to map antisemitic views in these three areas.

¹ See the definition of antisemitism by IHRA: <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/working-definition-antisemitism>

2.1 TRADITIONAL ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE

Social psychological theories dealing with prejudice distinguish three components or dimensions of prejudice: cognitive, affective and conative.

By the cognitive dimension of prejudice, we mean the content of prejudicial statements: the personality traits, characteristics, behaviours and historical and political roles that are attributed to the subject of prejudice according to the prejudiced person.

By the affective dimension of prejudice, we mean the emotions felt towards the object of prejudice, the emotional intensity of prejudice: distancing, rejection, aversion, dislike, hatred.

Finally, the conative dimension indicates a willingness to act in accordance with prejudice, such as a willingness to accept discrimination.

It is obvious that the three dimensions are independent: Those who agree with the prejudiced stereotypes about Jews that have long been present in society and are often heard during socialization and social learning, may not feel hostility or hatred for them or accept discrimination against Jews.

Therefore, in recent decades, empirical prejudice research has regularly tended to measure biased attitudes in all three dimensions and then summarize the three independent measurement results to determine the proportion of the biased group in the studied population. In examining traditional antisemitic prejudice, we also used this solution. We measured cognitive antisemitism with a separate set of questions about prejudicial stereotypes respondents accept (or reject) about Jews. For affective antisemitism, that is, how they felt about them, we asked respondents how likable or dislikeable they found them and how much social distance they felt existed between themselves and Jews. However, after due consideration, we did not measure the conative dimension separately. We included questions about readiness for prejudicial action and willingness to discriminate among the questions about the content of prejudices, as they showed a statistically very strong correlation with each other.

2.1.1 COGNITIVE ANTISEMITISM

The content of antisemitic prejudice was measured by a series of questions used several times in surveys in the last two decades. Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agreed with 10 statements.²

Two statements indicated traditional religious anti-Judaism:

- *Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews.*
- *The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God.*

Five statements expressed very common antisemitic stereotypes:

- *There is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world.*
- *Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals.*
- *Jews have too much influence in this country.*
- *Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society.*
- *The interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population.*

Three statements can be interpreted as a manifestation of a willingness to behave in a biased manner, to act and discriminate against Jews (conative dimension):

- *It would be best if Jews left this country.*

- *It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations.*
- *It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews.*

Based on the support or rejection of these statements measuring biased stereotyping, we created three groups. The first group included those who might accept one or two prejudiced stereotypes but based on the sum of their responses, scored low on the scale. The second group included those who were moderately prejudiced, and the third included those who were classified as strongly antisemitic on the basis of their scores.

During the process, we summed the scale values of each respondent by summing the values of the responses from 1 to 5 for the 10 statements to obtain a scale from 10 to 50. Those who fully agreed with all 10 antisemitic statements received $10 \times 5 = 50$ points, and those who rejected all antisemitic statements scored $10 \times 1 = 10$ points. Thus, based on their responses, each respondent received a score between 10 and 50. Those who received less than 50% of the 50 obtainable points were classified in the group of non-antisemites, while 50-74 points indicated moderate antisemites and 75-100 points marked the strong antisemites. Only those who answered at least five out of ten questions were classified to a group based on their scores.

²The cohesion and reliability of the scale were checked by principal component and reliability analysis. The statements that make up the cognitive scale and, according to our original intentions, the conative scale, were positioned on the same first unrotated principal component, each with very high factor scores. Therefore, both cognitive and conative content questions were fitted to a single scale. The explained variance of the first unrotated principal component (which contains 10 items) is 58.3% out of the total population of nearly 16,000 items. The Cronbach's Alpha value, which indicates the coherence of the scale, for the 10 variables of the antisemitism scale thus formed in the total population is 0.925 (for standardized items). The maximum value of Cronbach Alpha is = 1, which means that we managed to compile a very coherent set of items. The factor scores of the items on the first unrotated principal component are reported in the Appendix.

2.1.2 AFFECTIVE ANTISEMITISM

Researchers of prejudice generally agree that emotion toward groups – hatred, dislike, rejection, sense of distance – is a better indicator of prejudice than accepting negative stereotypes that can be part of learned “social knowledge” without any emotions attached to them. Therefore, in the course of our research, we also measured via three questions the degree of resentment towards Jews living in the country and the strength of the antisemitic sentiment in the studied population. We first asked whether the respondent would rank him/herself more among those who had resentment against Jews or those who had no resentment. The second question we used to examine the strength of antisemitic sentiments was a so-

called “sympathy thermometer”: Interviewees were asked to use a nine-point scale to tell whether they liked or disliked the listed ethnic groups, including Jews. Finally, as a third question, we used one of the statements on the Bogardus scale, which is often used to measure sensed social distance, and asked whether the respondent, if asked for his or her opinion, would give consent for a Jew to move to his or her neighbourhood. (This question was asked about members of 12 ethnic-religious groups). Respondents were again classified into three groups: non-antisemites, moderate antisemites, and strong antisemites, based on their responses to the three questions.

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Table 1: The logic of developing an indicator of affective antisemitism based on three questions

	Resentment against Jews	Disliking Jews	It would be unpleasant to have a Jewish neighbour
	+	+	+
	-	+	+
Strong antisemites	+	-	+
	+	+	-
	+	-	-
Moderate antisemites	-	+	-
	-	-	+
Non-antisemites	-	-	-

2.1.3 AGGREGATED PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM

The cognitive antisemitic and emotional antisemitic groups, although obviously largely overlapping, are not the same; their members are not necessarily identical. The hard, active and mobilisable antisemitic core is made up of those with strong antisemitism in both dimensions of prejudices against Jews.

Therefore, the next step in the analysis was to examine the size of this antisemitic core in the adult population and the size of the group whose members, although not strongly antisemitic, are not free from prejudices against Jews. Strong antisemites in-


cluded those who were highly prejudiced in both dimensions, cognitive and affective, and those who were strongly antisemitic in one dimension and moderately antisemitic in the other.

We considered moderate antisemites to be those who appeared among the moderate antisemites in both dimensions, and those who were in the strongly antisemitic group in one dimension and the non-antisemitic group in the other. Those who were classified as unclassifiable in one dimension were assigned to one of the groups according to their classification in the other dimension.

Table 2: Development of an aggregated antisemitism indicator considering cognitive and affective antisemitism together

	Cognitive antisemitism			
	Strong antisemites	Moderate antisemites	Non-antisemites	Unclassifiable
Strong antisemites	Strongly antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic
Moderate antisemites	Strongly antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Non-antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic
Non-antisemites	Moderately antisemitic	Non-antisemitic	Non-antisemitic	Non-antisemitic
Unclassifiable	Strongly antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Non-antisemitic	Unclassifiable

The flow of creating aggregated primary antisemitism



2.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

Antisemitism research in recent decades has shown that antisemitism can not only manifest itself in accepting and supporting traditional antisemitic prejudices but also in latent forms.

For a long time after the Second World War, there was a belief that mass murder against Jews would make all previous forms of antisemitism illegitimate, since it became clear that antisemitic prejudices, which were considered innocent in peacetime, could turn into murderous intent as circumstances changed.

It is no coincidence, then, that post-war antisemitism sought themes that were suitable for expressing antisemitic content but could also be publicly voiced, as their antisemitic content was only indirectly expressed and their antisemitic character could be denied at any time. One such theme is the denial or relativization of the Holocaust, such as presenting it as an unfortunate though usual occurrence as a war event, or calling into question its historical lessons, and, where relevant, denying responsibility for the persecution of Jews.

The denial and relativization of the Holocaust partially exonerate traditional antisemitism, as it denies that it would have had the murderous consequences attributed to it. At the same time, it justifies it because it accuses today's Jews of inventing historical fabrications, exaggerating the number of victims and extent of their suffering. This exaggeration is then used selfishly in order to increase profit and power to the detriment of the majority of society. Research usually refers to this form of antisemitism as secondary antisemitism.

During our research, we used seven statements to measure secondary antisemitism.³ Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale, from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree", how much they agree with these statements, including two about

relativizing the Holocaust and blaming the victims:

- *The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed.*
- *Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them.*

Three statements dealt with accusing Jews of inventing the "Holocaust myth" and using it for selfish purposes:

- *Many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by Jews later.*
- *Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes.*
- *Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust.*

And two statements measured opinions about the preservation of the memory of the Holocaust:

- *We must keep the memory of the persecution of the Jews alive.*
- *After so many decades have passed since the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda.*

Respondents who answered at least four questions were again divided into three groups based on their responses: Those who received 75-100 points of the maximum obtainable points were strong antisemites, those with 50-74 points were classified as moderate antisemites and the rest of the respondents were placed in the group of non-antisemites.

In most of the examined cases, agreement with the above statements clearly expresses antisemitic attitudes, but not always. Dealing with the Holocaust relatively often reflects a state of collective memory, for example, to relieve the tension that the respondent feels about belonging to a "guilty" community, or it may also express its agreement with memory policy efforts to remove dark spots in the national past, without this being coupled with antisemitic prejudice.

³For the total population, the explained variance of the first unrotated principal component containing 7 items is 56.3%. The Cronbach's Alpha value, which indicates the coherence of the scale, for the 7 variables of the secondary antisemitism scale, is 0.752 (standardized items). The factor scores of the items on the first unrotated principal component are reported in the Appendix.

2.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

Antisemitism expressed in anti-Israel opinions was measured by four statements. These are statements that extend the dislike of Israel to all Jews:

- *Because of Israel's politics, I dislike Jews more and more.*
- *When I think of Israel's politics, I understand why some people hate Jews.*

In addition, they use those historical analogies or set unique expectations, never used regarding other countries, that go beyond legitimate political criticism:

- *Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians.*

- *The Israeli policy towards the Palestinians justifies an international boycott of Israel.*

Respondents who answered at least two questions were also grouped according to the procedure described above: Those who received 75-100% of the maximum obtainable points were classified as strong antisemites, those who achieved 50-74% of the maximum score were grouped together as moderate antisemites, while the rest of the respondents made up the non-antisemitic group.

2.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM


Racial, religious and other group prejudices, including antisemitic prejudices, are among the views whose open acceptance in European societies is an open violation of the consensus condemning such views. One of the biggest problems in empirical research on prejudice is that they need to draw conclusions about the prejudices of the societies studied to know that prejudiced people are often reluctant to voice their prejudices publicly. Research on prejudice, and antisemitism in particular, clearly reports that this phenomenon, called latency pressure, is also strong among subjects of sociological surveys, meaning that many refrain from supporting antisemitic attitudes and opinions not only in public but even in personal interviews. These interviewees respond to latency pressure in three ways: They do not answer the questions asked even though they have an opinion; they don't say what they really think and give only expected answers; they express their hidden attitudes and views by

agreeing with statements that they consider publicly acceptable.

In our survey, we examined the latter form of latency manifestation.

In the measurement of secondary antisemitism and antisemitic hostility against Israel, we found that those who were classified as antisemitic according to the two indicators also gave a significantly higher proportion of antisemitic responses when measuring traditional antisemitism so that the three types of antisemitism were significantly correlated. However, during the analysis, we also identified a group that, based on the responses, is not characterized by traditional antisemitism but proved to be antisemitic in the other two dimensions. This group, which is characterized by both secondary antisemitism and antisemitic hostility against Israel but does not appear to be antisemitic in the traditional sense is considered latent antisemitism.

The flow of creating aggregated primary antisemitism



2.5 SOCIOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE

In addition to examining different forms of antisemitic prejudice and the size of antisemitic groups, our research also sought to answer what triggers anti-Jewish prejudice and what social groups are characterized by prejudiced thinking. Theories that seek to explore the causes of antisemitic prejudice usually trace antisemitism to the following factors, or some combination of these.

- Socio-demographic indicators: gender, age, place of residence, education
- Economic and social status
- Feeling subjective deprivation
- Xenophobia in general
- Feeling of distrust in politics, anomy
- Certain worldview settings
- Ideological-political convictions; belonging to political camps

During our study, when creating the model explaining antisemitic prejudice, we also examined the above factors, which were considered to be the causes of the intensity of antisemitism.

Numerous antisemitic studies have shown that socio-demographic status is associated with prejudice, meaning that older, less educated people living in small settlements, poor and feeling excluded from society, are more likely to accept antisemitic prejudices than others. In our research, we also examined the effect of these factors on antisemitism. Socio-economic status was measured using the ESOMAR methodology commonly applied in international research. The variable measuring social status was thus created from a combination of education and place in the occupational hierarchy.

The subjective deprivation variable, namely whether the respondent classifies him- or herself as belonging to a group with social disadvantages, was created based on two variables: We asked the interviewees if they see that they can make a living from their

income: Their income provides them a comfortable living, or it is just enough for covering the costs of living, or they are having a hard time making a living from their income, or they can barely make a living and they have serious financial difficulties (self-classification on a 4-point scale). With another question, we examined where the respondent ranks on a 10-point scale, 10 being those living at the highest standard of living.

Among the independent variables explaining antisemitism, we included general xenophobia, as several studies have shown that those who resent many groups considered as “strangers” treat Jews in the same way. The xenophobia index was created using a sympathy “thermometer”, which was also used to measure antisemitic prejudice, and questions about acceptance of the neighbourhood of 12 ethnic and religious groups.⁴

Prejudice research has also shown that feelings of vulnerability, powerlessness and homelessness in society, mistrust toward institutions, leaders and politics in general, so different forms of social anomie often induce prejudices, including antisemitic attitudes. This feeling of social anomie expressed in mistrust toward politics was measured by three statements: We considered those respondents anomic according to whom politicians did not care about people like them; those, who see that people similar to them, even if they wanted to, cannot influence the fate of the country; and those, who say that politicians in general do not seek the good of society.⁵

The anomie expressed in political distrust, the feeling of being let down by leaders, is directly related to a phenomenon called populism by political science; one of its main features is that it divides society into two sharply separated, opposing groups: the “people” and the “corrupt elite”;⁶

⁴ The xenophobia variable was created as an unrotated principal component. The explained variance of the first unrotated principal component in the total population is 50.2%. The Cronbach's alpha value, which indicates the coherence of the variables that make up the principal component, is 0.933 for the total population (for standardized items). The factor scores of the items on the first unrotated principal component are reported in the Appendix.

⁵ The political distrust variable was created as an unrotated principal component. The explained variance of the first unrotated principal component in the total population is 47.9%. The Cronbach's alpha value, which indicates the coherence of the variables that make up the principal component, is 0.445 (for standardized items) in the total population. The factor scores of the items on the first unrotated principal component are reported in the Appendix.

⁶ See Mudde (2007), *Cas Muddle, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge University Press 2007, p. 23.

Populism often sees the elite as “strangers” or as representatives of privileged social groups (cosmopolitans, global bourgeoisie, bankers and speculators, the international media elite) in which, according to antisemitic tradition, Jews were “overrepresented”. Therefore, populist views are often bound to antisemitic views. In our survey, we examined whether this relationship also exists in the cases we examined.

The populism index was measured by accepting or rejecting five statements (on a scale of 1-5)⁷:

- *Political parties just argue and are not able to solve serious problems facing our country;*
- *It would be better if a capable and strong leader decided on important issues even if s/he breaks certain rules.*
- *It would be better if people could decide directly, for example by referendum, on the most important political issues instead of Parliament deciding.*
- *It's better if people themselves take action to resolve social injustices, because politicians and parties are generally unable to resolve them.*
- *What politicians call a compromise is in fact giving up principles.*

Antisemitism often appears as part of worldviews and ideologies that have historically been intertwined with antisemitism, such as religiosity, value-conservatism, and nationalism. In our study, we sought to explore whether these correlations still exist today. The intensity of religiosity was measured by the degree of active participation in institutional religious life and the question about the intensity of the interviewee's subjective religiosity⁸.

- *Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?*
- *Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are a religious person, not a religious person or an atheist?*

The relationship between denominational affiliation and antisemitic prejudice was examined separately for respondents who declared themselves to belong to the Islamic denomination. To measure conservatism, we used four statements expressing emblematic conservative positions and again asked our interviewees whether they agreed with them or rejected them⁹:

- *Would you ban abortion - with the exception of some cases, for example rape – or would you not?*
- *Do you think it would be better if religious values played a greater role in raising children or do you not think it would be better?*
- *Do you consider homosexuality immoral or not immoral?*
- *Would you ban the use of so-called light drugs such as marijuana /cannabis or would you not ban use of such drugs?*

The strength of nationalist sentiments was measured by two statements/questions¹⁰:

- *Do you think it is your duty to stand up for your country even if it is on the wrong track or do you not think there is such a duty?*
- *The government should act more strongly to protect national interests against supranational institutions such as the EU.*

Finally, we examined if antisemitic prejudice was related to the respondent's own classification of belonging to the political right or left, or whether he or she supported right-wing, centrist or left-wing political parties in their country.¹¹

7 The populism variable was created as an unrotated principal component. The explained variance of the first unrotated principal component in the total population is 44.4%. Cronbach's alpha value, which indicates the coherence of the variables that make up the principal component, is 0.686 (for standardized items) in the total population. The factor scores of the items on the first unrotated principal component are reported in the Appendix.

8 The religiosity variable was created as a categorical variable. Based on the combined pattern of responses to the two questions cited, respondents were divided into five groups: 1-explicitly atheist, 2-rather non-religious, 3-moderately religious, 4-rather religious, 5-strongly religious.

9 The conservatism variable was created as an unrotated principal component. The explained variance of the first unrotated principal component in the total population is 49.6%. Cronbach's alpha for the coherence of the variables that make up the principal component: 0.577 on the whole population (for standardized items). The factor scores of the items on the first unrotated principal component are reported in the Appendix.

10 The nationalism variable was created as a categorical variable. Based on the combined pattern of answers to the two questions cited, we divided the respondents into five groups: 5 -very nationalist, 4-nationalist, 3-ambivalent, 2-not nationalist, 1-not nationalist at all.

11 Respondents were asked to indicate where they would place themselves on a nine-point scale between the right (9) and left (1) endpoints. During the interview, respondents were also asked to select the one they would vote for at the time of the interview from the list of all parties that ran in the last election in that country. The parties were then classified into left-wing, centrist and right-wing parties using expert categorisation. These categories were used for the analysis.

2.6 SYMPATHY FOR JEWS AND SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL

In our research, we also examined a phenomenon that is not usually included in antisemitism studies: sympathy for Jews and sympathy for Israel. We have primarily sought to identify those who consider it important and useful that Jews also live in the country and also that the Jewish religion and culture should survive in Europe. We used two statements to measure sympathy for Jews¹²:

- *I think it is good for a country if many Jews live there.*
- *Here in Europe, we should do everything we can to preserve Jewish religion and culture.*

Sympathy for Israel was measured by agreeing with (or not) three statements¹³:

- *Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies.*
- *Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East.*
- *Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism.*

We considered those group for philosemitic whose members scored high in both dimensions. In the analysis, we sought to identify the characteristics and place of the philosemitic and Israel-friendly groups in a given society, as well as to explore the socio-political background of the two attitudes.

2.7 METHOD OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

In the causal explanation of antisemitic prejudice, we seek to show what economic, social, and political factors determine the prevalence and intensity of antisemitism in society and which strata are most susceptible to antisemitism. In the analysis, we considered antisemitic prejudice to be the explained, dependent variable. Following the sociological theories of antisemitism, we examined 11 factors as explanatory variables, meaning that we assumed these have measurable effects on the dependent variable.

The explanatory variables included in the analysis were as follows¹⁴:

- Law and Order conservatism
- Distrust in politics
- Populism
- Xenophobia
- Nationalism

- Religiosity
- Subjective deprivation
- Social status (ESOMAR)
- Age groups
- Size of settlement
- Left-right political self-classification

To examine the causal relationships, a multivariate statistical method, so-called logistic regression modelling, was used.

Manifest, traditional antisemitic prejudice, called aggregated primary antisemitism, was defined as a dependent, explained variable in the model.

The model examines the probability of predicting whether someone is antisemitic based on the 11 explanatory variables. The explanatory force of the model is shown by an indicator (Nagelkerke R²) that can take values between 0 and 1. If this indicator is 0,

¹² The variable sympathy for Jews was created as a categorical variable: Based on the combined pattern of answers to the two questions quoted, we divided the respondents into 3 groups: 1-non-philosemitic, 2-moderately philosemitic, 3-clearly philosemitic.

¹³ Sympathy for Israel was also constructed as a categorical variable: summed up by the values of 1-5 in the responses to the three quoted statements, to obtain a scale of 3-15. Those who agreed with all three expressions of sympathy for Israel received 15 points. Based on their position on this scale, we formed three groups: 1-not an Israel-friendly 2-moderately Israel-friendly 3-strongly Israel-friendly.

¹⁴ A detailed description of the explanatory factors is presented in the chapter "Sociological Determinants of Antisemitic Prejudice".

then the independent variables have no explanatory force, but if it is 1, they explain the dependent variable completely, 100%.

The method used can also show which are the factors that most strongly influence whether someone is antisemitic or not, and which are the ones that are less closely related to antisemitism. For explanatory variables, the so-called odds ratio (ratio of the probability) shows the behaviour of the explained variable. An odds ratio higher than 1 indicates an increase in the likelihood of

antisemitism between the two groups, while less than 1 indicates a decrease. So, for example, if the odds ratio resulting from the comparison of the elderly and the young is 0.5, then (all other things being equal) a young respondent is half as likely of being antisemitic as an elderly one. And if, for example, the odds ratio resulting from the comparison of high social status and low social status is 2, then a low-status respondent is twice as likely to be antisemitic as a high-status respondent.¹⁵

15 For statistical reasons, the target variables were dichotomized, converted into two values. The first value was attributed to those who proved to be strongly and moderately antisemitic on the aggregated primary antisemitic scale. The second value was attributed to those who were non-antisemitic. All explanatory variables were uniformly transformed into a three-point scale, depending on whether the value achieved by the respondent on the scale belonged to the upper and lower 40% of the values recorded by the variable, and to the middle 20% value range. To calculate the odds ratios, we compared the respondents in the upper and lower 40%. Exceptions to this were age, social status and settlement size, where it was not possible to keep the 40-20-40% rule, so we formed 3 groups using different methods.

3 EUROPEAN OVERVIEW

In this section, we present the results of our study integrated into the European picture.

As we have seen before, we used a total of 24 questions to measure antisemitism. We measured the cognitive and conative dimensions of prejudice with 10 questions, and three additional questions for the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is, to measure the emotional charge of antisemitic prejudice. We mapped secondary antisemitism relativizing the Holocaust with seven questions and antisemitic hostility against

Israel with four questions.

We used two and three questions, respectively, to measure sympathy for Jews and for Israel.

With the exception of questions about affective antisemitism, all questions were asked in the same form: Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how much they agreed with the statements in the question (strongly agree; tend to agree; neither agree nor disagree; tend to disagree; strongly disagree).¹⁶


3.1 QUESTIONS MEASURING COGNITIVE AND CONATIVE ANTISEMITISM

With questions measuring cognitive and conative antisemitism, we examined the acceptance of long-standing, known antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices. Looking at the results, we see that most of the 16,000


respondents surveyed in 16 countries agreed with the stereotype that Jews were a distinct interest group (21%) and the well-known stereotype of the secret Jewish world conspiracy (21%).

¹⁶ The agreement rates for the five-point scales in this chapter are the combined ratio of those who strongly agree and those who tend to agree. All data for the total sample of 16,000 people were calculated by projection weighting, considering the different populations of the countries in addition to the demographic adjustment.

The interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population




There is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the worlds




Statements indicating the willingness to discriminate were the least accepted: The occupational restrictions on Jews would be considered desirable by 8 and 10%, respectively. The emigration of Jews and the introduction of

It would be best if Jews left this country

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA




It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations




Likewise, relatively few profess antisemitic views stemming from traditional religious anti-Judaism: 8 and 13% of those surveyed agreed with the related statements, respectively.

The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA



Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews




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
Nevertheless, not surprisingly, there are significant differences between the values measured in each country. On average, respondents in Greece agreed with traditional antisemitic prejudices and opinions in an exceptionally high proportion. Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks and Austrians also accepted these statements at a significantly higher rate than the European average. In Romania, acceptance of religious antisemitic beliefs was strikingly

high: In these respects, Romania appears to be the second most antisemitic country after Greece, while it ranks first in only three questions. These countries are very different from the countries that accept the least antisemitic response. Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were included in this group. In these countries, the proportion of those who accept traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes and prejudices is negligible.

It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews




Jews have too much influence in this country




Jews will never be able to fully integrate into the society

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA



Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals




3.2 COGNITIVE ANTISEMITISM

According to the cognitive antisemitism indicator based on the responses given to each question, such prejudice – that is, acceptance of traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes – is common to 34% of the total sample, of which 6% is strongly antisemitic.

The proportion of cognitive antisemites is higher than average in Poland (68%) but

also in Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Austria and the Czech Republic. The proportion of strongly antisemites is the highest in Hungary (17%) after Greece (25%). In contrast, very few in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom accept traditional antisemitic stereotypes.

Cognitive antisemitism in the 16 countries



3.3 QUESTIONS MEASURING AFFECTIVE ANTISEMITISM

Affective antisemitism – hostility towards Jews – is measured by three statements. The first consisted of answers to a question to be decided (dichotomous). We asked the interviewees which group they would classify themselves as belonging to: those who disliked Jews or those who did not dislike Jews.


Overall, 11% of respondents in the 16 coun-

tries surveyed said they had more negative feelings towards Jews.

Most people in Greece (36%), Hungary (27%), Poland (23%) and Slovakia (21%) have a dislike for Jews. The lowest proportions of respondents in the Netherlands (2%), the United Kingdom, Sweden (3-3%) and Latvia (5%) say they resent Jews.

Do you rather have negative feelings about the Jews or you rather not have such feelings?

● Rather have negative feelings ● Rather have not negative feelings ● DK / NA




A so-called sympathy thermometer was used as a second measure of affective anti-semitism. On this nine-point scale, respondents were able to express their feelings for Jews on a nine-point scale ranging from “negative feelings” (1) to “positive feelings” (9). On this scale, the average of respondents in 16 countries was slightly above the middle of the scale (5.54), indicating more positive feelings than negative ones. An average of 10 countries entered the sympathetic range with a value higher than five, while the average results of six countries – Hungary (4.56), Greece (4.70), Slovakia (4.71), Austria (4.76), the Czech Republic (4.86) and Poland (4.89) – rather indicated a dislike.

A scale value of 1–3 expressing strong dislike was chosen by 10% of all respondents – 25% of Greeks, 22% of Hungarians and 21% of Czechs.

On the other hand, with relatively high sympathy averages at the other endpoint are the Dutch (6.53), UK residents (6.42) and Swedes (6.17). In these countries, the proportion of those who have negative feelings towards Jews (on a scale of 1 to 3) is very low, 2% in the Netherlands and 3% in Britain and Sweden.

The 6–9 scale of having positive feelings towards Jews were chosen by 26% of all respondents, while 52% of the Dutch, 43% of those living in the United Kingdom, 38% of the French and 37% of those living in Belgium gave an answer that can be assessed as sympathy for Jews. The proportion of the same respondents was only 10% in Hungary, 12% in Slovakia and 13% in Austria.

Some people have positive feelings for different groups of people, some have negative feelings. Using a scale from 1 to 9, please indicate your feelings towards people from the following group: JEWS




Our third question for estimating affective antisemitism has already been used in many previous research studies to measure perceived social distance from a social group: We asked our interviewees whether it would be uncomfortable for them if their neighbour was Jewish. On a four-point scale (totally uncomfortable; uncomfortable; comfortable; totally comfortable), the first two choices were considered antisemitic. To this question, 15% of the respondents from 16 European countries gave an antisemitic pattern-oriented response, showing how many

of them declared that it would be uncomfortable or totally uncomfortable for them to have a Jewish neighbour.

Greeks (36%), Slovaks (33%) and Poles (31%) rejected the Jewish neighbourhood at a much higher than average rate, and the Czechs (27%), Austrians (26%), Romanians (25%) and Hungarians (25%) were slightly above average. At the same time, the Jewish neighbourhood would disturb Swedes, the Dutch and the people in the UK in a much lower than average proportion (4% in all three countries).

We are sometimes more happy with some neighbours, and more unhappy with others. How would you feel about having someone from one of the following group as your neighbour: JEW

● Totally uncomfortable ● Uncomfortable
● Comfortable ● Totally comfortable ● DK / NA




3.4 AFFECTIVE ANTISEMITISM

The proportion of affective antisemites – those who dislike Jews – was 23% of the total sample, so significantly lower than those who accepted prejudiced stereotypes. In this dimension, 12% of respondents proved to be strongly antisemitic, while 11% were moderately antisemitic. This data differs in nature from that measured for cognitive antisemitism, where the proportion of moderate antisemites significantly exceeded that of strongly antisemites. Another important dif-

ference is that the proportion of strongly affective antisemites is higher in all countries than that of strongly cognitive antisemites. This difference may be a sign that a decline in acceptance of traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes, or an awareness that supporting them today is illegitimate and contrary to the norms of political correctness, does not necessarily mean a similar decline in antisemitic sentiment.

Affective antisemitism in the 16 countries



It is noteworthy that the difference between the rates of strongly cognitive antisemites and strongly affective antisemites is particularly large in the Czech Republic, where the former is rather low (6%) but the latter is extremely high (26%), the third highest among the countries surveyed. This can also be explained by the fact that in the


Czech Republic, there is a very strong dislike of other ethnic groups. The Czech Republic is characterized by the highest xenophobia among the studied countries. Thus, this value might be much more of a manifestation of general xenophobia extended to Jews than a sign of specific, antisemitic prejudice.

3.5 AGGREGATED PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: MANIFEST ANTISEMITISM

We consider agreeing with traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes and having hostile emotions toward Jews as primary, manifest antisemitism. Based on the aggregated antisemitism indicator created by measuring and combining these two dimensions, in the following we compare the intensities of primary, manifest antisemitism in the countries surveyed.

According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which summarizes the results of measuring cognitive and affective antisemitism, 20% of the total sample, one-fifth of the adult population in the 16 countries surveyed, is considered antisemitic, while 12% are strongly antisemitic and 8%, moderately antisemitic.

Aggregated primary antisemitism in the 16 countries




Comparing the data measured in each country, we see that there are far more antisemites than average in Greece (48%), Poland (42%), Hungary (42%), Slovakia (39%), the Czech Republic (36%), Romania (38%) and Austria (31%). The proportion of strong antisemites in Greece is almost three times the average (35%) and is highest in Austria (21%) outside the former “Eastern Bloc”. In

contrast, in three Western European countries, the proportion of those who accept traditional antisemitic prejudices and are also averse to Jews is negligible: In Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, only 3 to 6% of the adult population is antisemitic according to the aggregated primary antisemitism indicator.

Cognitive and Affective antisemitism in the 16 countries

Affective antisemitism



38

The results obtained in the measurement of primary antisemitism show characteristic regional differences.¹⁷ As previous studies have shown, Greece has a remarkably high rate of nurturing antisemitic prejudices and sentiments. But the proportion of antisemites is also significantly higher than average in the post-communist region of Central

and Eastern Europe and in Austria. The proportion of manifest antisemites is lower than average in the studied countries of the Western European continent and Latvia. In three states of the Western Protestant cultural sphere, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Britain, the proportion of those with antisemitic attitudes is negligible.

¹⁷ In the graph, the dashed line represents the linear trend fitted to the data.

3.6 QUESTIONS MEASURING SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM

The seven questions used to measure secondary antisemitism measured the frequency of denial and relativization¹⁸ of the importance of the Holocaust and Holocaust remembrance. Responses to statements about Holocaust denial and relativization indicate antisemitism at a lesser extent for the total 16 countries (10–15%) than statements that questioned the importance of Holocaust remembrance¹⁹ (19–21%).

In this series of questions, too, the same countries proved to be more antisemitic than average in measuring the cognitive and affective dimensions of prejudice: Greece, Poland and Hungary were among the three countries with the most antisemitic answers in a significant part of the relevant questions.

However, the overall picture is partly dif-

ferent: The proportion of secondary antisemites in Austria, Latvia and Romania is also much higher than average. These countries proved to be relatively less antisemitic in terms of primary antisemitism. This may indicate that latency pressure is strong in these countries, so antisemitic prejudices are not directly expressed. Austrians, mainly concerning the preservation of the memory of the Holocaust, (in five questions) and Romanians (in three questions) were among the three countries with the highest proportion of answers indicating antisemitic attitudes. The lowest values in the field of Holocaust relativization were also measured in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

¹⁸ "The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed."

"Many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later."

"Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them."


¹⁹ "After so many decades have passed since the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda."

"Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust."


"Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes."

The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA




Many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later




Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA




After so many decades have passed since the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree
- DK / NA




Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA




Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA



We must keep the memory of the persecution of the Jews alive

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA




3.7 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM

The distribution of antisemitic attitudes in denying, relativizing and disputing the historical lessons of the Holocaust in the studied 16 countries is similar in some respects but different in others than in primary, manifest antisemitic prejudices.

Out of the total sample, 39% agreed with statements expressing secondary antisemitism, which is twice the proportion of manifest (primary) antisemites.

Secondary antisemitism in the 16 countries



In the dimension of secondary antisemitism, 6% of the total sample is considered strongly antisemitic, which is less than the proportion of strong antisemites among primary manifest antisemites (12%). This is the case for all countries except Latvia.


However, the overall proportion of secondary antisemites is higher than that of primary antisemites (39% vs. 20%). This is due to a significantly higher proportion of moderate antisemites among respondents (33%) compared to manifest antisemites (8%). This higher rate indicates that many of those who are not antisemitic according to primary antisemitic indicators tend to agree with some of the Holocaust-related statements expressing secondary antisemitism.

It is noteworthy that this higher rate can also be observed in some countries, mainly in Western Europe, where the proportion of primary, manifest antisemites is low: the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Germany. This obviously indicates the strength of the latency pressure that prevents the appearance of manifest antisemitism.

This also proves that it is justified to distinguish and examine primary and secondary antisemitism separately, as the function of a group of opinions and attitudes called secondary antisemitism is in many cases to express antisemitism, which is openly considered unacceptable.

Primary and Secondary antisemitism in the 16 countries

Secondary antisemitism



Significantly higher-than-average secondary antisemitism is largely found in countries with high rates of manifest antisemitism (Poland: 71%, Greece: 67%, Romania: 63%, Hungary: 63%, Austria: 58%) and ongoing debates about the role and responsibility for the Holocaust.

Latvia “stands out” as Holocaust relativization is the fifth highest (58%), while manifest antisemitism shows an average rate.

The exceptionally high Polish data clearly reflect the debates and socio-political con-

licts that have taken place in Poland and Latvia in recent years. These public debates, which provoked heated domestic and international reactions, revolved around the issues of social responsibility for the Holocaust and victimhood as well as the historical memory of them. Raising the topic of taking responsibility for the Holocaust is seen by many Polish and Latvian influential opinion leaders as a provocation of hostile forces that threaten national identity. The effects of this are evident in our survey as well.

3.8 QUESTIONS MEASURING ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

Antisemitism expressed in anti-Israel sentiment was measured by four questions.²⁰ Though there is an ongoing debate about the antisemitic meaning of different statements about Israel, there is consensus, that three of the statements on the questionnaire certainly express antisemitic attitudes, however, supporting the boycott against Israel is not necessarily antisemitic. Since statistical analysis proved that the four statements strongly correlate²¹, we used all of them for measuring antisemitic attitudes. The group of antisemites included those whose added score was higher than 50 % of the maximum score on the five-point scale (>10), that is they expressed full or partial agreement with the listed statements.

In the sample of 16 countries, the pro-

portion of those who chose responses in connection with Israel that indicates antisemitism was much higher than in the case of traditional antisemitic views and secondary antisemitism relativizing the Holocaust. This indicates that many of those who nurture antisemitic sentiment in the studied countries feel strong latency pressure and therefore express their antisemitic sentiment through opinions that they consider to be publicly acceptable. A quarter (25.26%) of the respondents agreed with three of the four statements. This proportion was lower only in the case of the statement (15%) that directly reflected the respondents’ personal antisemitic feelings in their views on Israel: “Because of Israel’s politics, I dislike Jews more and more”.

20 “When I think of Israel’s politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews.”

“Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians.”


“The Israeli policy towards the Palestinians justifies an international boycott of Israel.”

“Because of Israel’s politics, I dislike Jews more and more.”


21 See footnote 6.

When I think of Israel's politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA




Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians




The Israeli policy towards the Palestinians justifies an international boycott of Israel

● Strongly agree ● Tend to agree ● Neither agree nor disagree
 ● Tend to disagree ● Strongly disagree ● DK / NA



Because of Israel's politics, I dislike Jews more and more




A comparison of the national results shows a slightly different picture from the results discussed earlier. Once again, the Greeks were among the three countries with the most antisemitic answers, along with the Austrians and Poles. Although, the Dutch

proved to be the least antisemitic, they stated in an extremely high proportion that because of Israel's politics, they understand why many people hate Jews (32%), although only 4% say they feel the same way for that reason.

3.9 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

The results of measuring antisemitic attitudes in accepting opinions of antisemitic hostility against Israel differ from those presented when analysing the primary and secondary forms of antisemitism. According to our survey, 49% of the total sample is a group whose members can be considered antisemitic based on their views of Israel.

Antisemitic hostility against Israel in the 16 countries




This ratio is higher than the ratio of antisemites measured in the dimensions previously presented. Within this group, 39% are moderately and 10% are strongly antisemitic. While the proportion of strong antisemites among the primary, manifest antisemites was roughly the same (12%), the proportion of moderate antisemites was also much higher in this dimension (39%) than among the primary, manifest antisemites (8%) and also higher among secondary antisemites (33%). This indicates that some of those who have not proved to be prejudiced in measuring primary, manifest antisemitism are willing to accept the majority of anti-Israel statements expressing anti-Jewish attitudes, which again can signal the transformation and latency of antisemitism. On the other hand, according to this calculation, a small group of respondents who agree with boycotting Israel for political reasons but who only partially agree with the other three statements could also appear among the moderate antisemites,

though they may not be considered as such. Without this group, the proportion of moderate antisemites is approximately the same as the proportion measured in the other dimension showing latency.

We investigated separately the group of those, who agreed with boycotting Israel since this position does not necessarily the express antisemitism. We found that 20% of those who supported the statement about the boycott (25% of the total sample) have not supported any of the other three statements. This group (5% of the total) is very probably not antisemitic. On the other hand, 25% of the group agreed with all the other statements concerning Israel, and 27-28% was the proportion of those who agreed with one or two such statements. Thus, about three-quarter of those who accepted a seemingly non-antisemitic statement about Israel are inclined to accept the obviously antisemitic ones as well.

Primary antisemitism and antisemitic hostility against Israel in the 16 countries

Antisemitic hostility against Israel



The distribution of antisemitic hostility against Israel differs country to country from what we saw for primary and secondary antisemitism. In the Polish and Greek samples, the proportion of those showing antisemitic attitudes against Israel was remarkably high (74% and 70%, respectively), but in this dimension, this proportion was highest in Austria (76%), and those who are strongly antisemitic against Israel (28%) also exceeded the rate of any other country.

It is striking that these countries are not followed by those with relatively high levels of antisemitism according to the indicators analysed earlier, but by Belgium (62%) and France (59%). Together with Spain, these three countries are those where neither primary nor secondary antisemitism was outstandingly strong, but the level of antisemitic hostility against Israel attitude is very high.

On the other hand, in some of the post-communist societies that appear to be significantly more antisemitic than average in the other dimensions examined, anti-

semitic hostility against Israel is relatively moderate. This group of countries includes Slovakia (58%), Hungary (53%), Romania (49%) and the Czech Republic (46%).

Latvia, Italy and Germany have much lower levels of antisemitic hostility against Israel than French, Belgian or Spanish data. The 36% in Latvia is one of the lowest rates in the 16 countries surveyed. The data measured in Latvia are practically the same as the data measured in the least antisemitic societies in other respects. In the Netherlands and Sweden, the rate of antisemitic hostility against Israel was 36%, and it was 31% in the UK, which is much higher than that of manifest and secondary antisemites. This also indicates that in these countries, where manifest antisemitism is very low, the unseen, latent antisemitism is often expressed through these views. However, it has to be added to the picture that among those who supported the boycott of Israel 33% in the UK and 29% in Sweden rejected the other three statements.

3.10 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

As noted earlier, Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism and antisemitic hostility against Israel may express antisemitism in a way that avoids open acceptance of traditional prejudices. However, secondary antisemites and those who display antisemitic hostility against Israel cannot automatically and without question be considered latent antisemites who hide their real views.


Agreeing with statements about responsibility for the Holocaust and for the persecution of the Jews, and preserving the memory of the Holocaust, which mostly express secondary antisemitism, may indicate not only antisemitic attitudes, but also which side the respondent is in current debates about historical memory. Previous research

has shown that many people do not refuse to take historical responsibility for the persecution of Jews and do not blame Jews for abusing Holocaust memory because they are antisemites, instead because it hurts their national pride to belong to a community which is guilty of war crimes, and they feel that acknowledging responsibility limits their ability to proudly express their national identity.

The situation is similar for some of those who accept anti-Israel statements. As noted earlier, the motive for their choice is not always covert personal antisemitism, but at least in their view it is an expression of their political affiliation.

Secondary antisemitism and antisemitic hostility against Israel in the 16 countries

Antisemitic hostility against Israel



On the graph showing the relation between secondary antisemitism and antisemitic hostility against Israel, there is a group of countries characterised by both high Holocaust-related and anti-Israel antisemitism. These include the countries of the former Soviet bloc (except for Latvia) as well as Austria and Greece. Latvia is the only country where low antisemitic hostility against Israel is coupled with high Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism. A suspected cause of this is probably linked to a conflict around historical memory we mentioned previously.

Most Western European countries are

characterised by distinctly strong antisemitic hostility against Israel and moderate antisemitism related to the Holocaust. This is the most apparent in Belgium, France, and Spain. The Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom form a group of countries characterised by relatively moderate antisemitic hostility against Israel and low Holocaust-related antisemitism. It is also striking that in these countries, the proportion of those who display only antisemitic hostility against Israel is much higher than the proportion of both manifest antisemites and those prone to Holocaust relativization.

Taking all these aspects into account, not everyone who scored high on secondary antisemitism scale or on the scale for antisemitic hostility against Israel was classified as a latent antisemite. Out of the total sample, 7% relativize the Holocaust but are not openly prejudiced, nor do they share antisemitic hostility against Israel. Among them may be those who were not driven by antisemitism but rather by debates over historical memory. The proportion of those who have antisemitic hostility against Israel but are not prone to prejudice or Holocaust relativization is 19%. Although both of these two groups may include latent antisemites, a large proportion of them are probably not latent antisemites. So, in order to make an accurate estimate of latency, these two groups were not considered latent antisemites.

In measuring latent antisemitism, we assumed that these two dimensions only together measure the degree of latency accurately. If someone does not manifest antisemitism but agrees with statements about both secondary antisemitism and antisemitic hostility against Israel, then this respond-


ent is most likely a latent antisemite. Thus, we classified as latent antisemites those who were strongly or moderately antisemitic when measuring both secondary antisemitism and antisemitic hostility against Israel, but were included in the group of non-antisemites when measuring primary antisemitism.

The latter condition is important because the majority of those who prove simultaneously antisemitic in the secondary and antisemitic-hostility-against-Israel dimensions are antisemitic according to the primary antisemitism indicator as well, so their prejudice is not latent at all but very manifest in several dimensions. As we saw earlier, 20% of respondents (12% strongly and 8% moderately) were classified as manifest antisemites. Among them, 83% were also secondary antisemites relativizing the Holocaust, while 77% also agreed with statements expressing antisemitic hostility against Israel.

According to the above definition of latency, 14% of respondents in the total sample proved to be latent antisemites.

Primary and latent antisemitism in the 16 countries

● Strongly antisemitic ● Moderately antisemitic ● Latent antisemitic



Comparing certain countries, we can see that the intensity of latent antisemitism differs from that observed in the study of primary antisemitism.

Poland and Austria are the countries where the proportion of both manifest and latent antisemites is high.

This also indicates that in other countries with high primary antisemitism, such as Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Romania, respondents feel less latency pressure, meaning they are less likely to reject the open expression of antisemitic views.


The proportion of latent antisemites is higher than average in Latvia (19%), France (18%), Spain (17%) and Belgium (15%). This may indicate the relative strength of perceived latency pressure in these countries. In Italy and Germany, the proportion of latent antisemites and manifest primary antisemites is also lower than average.

It is striking that in the least antisemitic countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden

and the United Kingdom, the proportion of latent antisemites is also lower than in other countries. At the same time, it can be observed that there are far more people who achieved a high value on the two latency scales separately (Holocaust-relativization, Israel) than the ratio of the measured latency. In these countries, among those who do not simultaneously accept Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism and support antisemitic hostility against Israel, relatively many people support either one or the other. This may also mean that in reality, there are more latent antisemites in these groups than in other countries, but as an expression of their hostility toward Jews, those who support the nationalist right-wing only agree with Holocaust-relativization, and supporters of the radical left only have antisemitic hostility against Israel. If this is the case – and this requires further research to tell –, the proportion of latent antisemites in these countries is slightly higher than our estimate.

Primary antisemitism and latent antisemitism in the 16 countries

Latent antisemitism



3.11 PRIMARY AND LATENT ANTISEMITISM: THE COMPLETE PICTURE

It follows from the above analysis that the most accurate picture of the degree of antisemitic prejudice is obtained by considering the combined ratio of manifest and latent antisemites as the relevant indicator. This proportion is 34% of the total sample, representing the population of 16 countries, so one-third of the adult population in the countries surveyed is considered antisemitic. The combined proportion of manifest and latent antisemites is the highest in Poland (66%) and higher than average in Greece

(64%), Hungary (59%), Austria (56%), Slovakia (53%), Romania (53%) and the Czech Republic (46%). At the other end of the scale are the United Kingdom (16%), Sweden (10%) and the Netherlands (8%). All of this means that the antisemitic potential, along with Greece and Austria, is strongest in the countries of the former communist bloc: 46–66% of the population of these countries nurture antisemitic prejudices and sentiments, which they are willing to express in both open or covert form.


3.12 QUESTIONS MEASURING SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL

Our series of questions on Israel also included statements suitable for identifying a group whose members expressly sympathize with the Jewish state, regarding it as the only democracy in the region and an ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism.²²

Responses showing sympathy for Israel were given by 23-35% of the European


sample of 16 countries, meaning that they strongly or tend to agree with the statements made in the three questions. Citizens of European countries least agreed with the statement that Israel is the only democratic state in the region (23%) and most supported the statement that Israel is an important ally in the fight against terrorism (35%).

Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies



²² "Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies."
 "Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East."
 "Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism."

Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism



63

The average rate of responses in favour of Israel is highest in Romania, the Czech Republic and Germany, and lowest in Austria, Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Interestingly, in many countries where antisemitic responses are generally high, the proportion of sympathizers with Israel is also high, such as Poland and Romania.


3.13 QUESTIONS MEASURING SYMPATHY FOR THE JEWS

Respondents were also confronted with two statements expressing sympathy for Jews and Judaism. Of the total sample of 16,000, 20% thought it was good to have many Jews living in the country, however only 38% agreed that Jewish religion and culture


should be preserved in Europe by any and all means.

We met respondents sympathetic towards Jews in the highest proportions in the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Germany.

Here in Europe, we should do everything we can to preserve Jewish religion and culture



I think it is good for a country if many Jews live there



Sympathy towards Jews was found in the lowest proportions among Greeks, Slovaks and Poles. It is worth noting that in some countries, the proportion of those who believe Jewish religion and culture must be preserved far exceeds that of those who find

the presence of Jews useful in the country: For example, the difference between the first statement and the second statement is 30 percentage points in the Netherlands and 27 percentage points in Germany.


3.14 PHILOSEMITISM

In our survey, we used two sets of questions to measure whether or not respondents nurtured positive attitudes toward Jews and the Jewish state, Israel. We considered respondents to be sympathetic to Jews who think it is important to preserve Jewish traditions and the presence of Jews in the country where they live. And we considered respondents to be friends of Israel who are on the same side as Israel in the current political conflicts and see the Jewish state as an important political ally.

Although positive attitudes and opinions in both dimensions most often express a philosemitic attitude, it is easy to see that both the first and second sets of opinions can be accompanied by prejudice. Therefore, we assumed that the two indicators could only be used together to measure philosemitism. So, we can only classify those as philosemitic who achieved high values on a scale measur-

ing both sympathy for Jews and friendship with Israel. In the integrated philosemitic indicator, 22% of the total population of the 16 countries studied are classified as strongly philosemitic, 34% moderately and 44% non-philosemitic.

If we look at the proportion of those with antisemitic prejudices within these groups, we can see that, measured on the primary, manifest antisemitism scale, the strongly philosemitic all fall into the non-antisemitic group, so they are not characterized by antisemitism at all. Ninety percent of moderate philosemites are non-antisemitic, while 10% are in one of the antisemitic groups (4% are moderately and 6% are strongly prejudiced), mainly due to the relatively high proportion of strongly or moderately anti-Jewish prejudices among the supporters of Israel (22% and 21%, respectively).




Based on the integrated indicator created using two variables, philosemitism is strongest in the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In these countries, as we have seen before, not only is philosemitism strong, but also antisemitism is weak. These countries also achieved high values on a scale measuring positive attitudes towards Jews; however, in the results about attitudes towards Israel, the United Kingdom and Sweden are falling behind. It is also striking that in post-communist countries, except for Latvia, support for Israel is much stronger than sympathy for Jews. While sympathy for Jews is lowest in these countries, Polish, Romanian and Czech re-

spondents, for example, are much more sympathetic to Israel than respondents in several countries with much smaller antisemitic populations.

In the integrated indicator, the least philosemitic countries are Austria, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Greece. Poland has become one of the least philosemitic country, even though it has the highest proportion of respondents with an Israeli-friendly attitude. In Poland, a significant part of these respondents could not be included among the philosemites based on the integrated philosemitism indicator because, in addition to their sympathy for Israel, they were also characterized by an antisemitic attitude.

Primary antisemitism and integrated philosemitism


Integrated philosemitism



4 THE MUSLIM POPULATION AND ANTISEMITISM

Number of more or less accurate estimates of the number and proportion of the Muslim population in European countries are known. One of the most widely used and frequently cited data set is the analysis and forecast published by Pew Research Center in November 2017.²³

Estimation of the PEW Research Center on the proportion of the Muslim population in European countries²⁴



²³ Pew (2017) Europe's Growing Muslim Population, Pew Research Center (November 29, 2017)

<https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/>

²⁴ Hackett (2017) Hackett, Conrad: „5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe“, Pew Research Center (November 29, 2017)

<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/>

Basically, it is very similar but in some respects, we still find different proportions on the World Population Review website.²⁴ The available information on the number and proportion of the Muslim population for the 16 countries we examined is summarised in the following table.

Table 3: Estimates of the number and proportion of the Muslim population

	Estimated % of Muslims among total population		Number of Muslim Population
	Pew Research Center 2016	World Population Review 2020	World Population Review 2020
Austria	6.9%	8.0%	712,000
Belgium	7.6%	7.6%	879,377
Czech Republic	0.2%	0.15%	15,000
France	8.8%	8.8%	5,720,000
Germany	6.1%	5.7%	4,750,000
Greece	5.7%	5.7%	613,406
Hungary	0.4%	0.5%	50,000
Italy	4.8%	4.8%	2,987,840
Latvia	0.2%	0.15%	2,000
Netherlands	7.1%	5.1%	880,000
Poland	<0.1%	0.02%	6,796
Romania	0.4%	0.65%	136,500
Slovakia	0.1%	0.15%	10,866
Spain	2.6%	2.6%	1,180,000
Sweden	8.1%	8.1%	800,000
United Kingdom	6.3%	6.3%	4,130,000

Based on Pew Research Center estimates, the proportion of Muslims in the total population of the 16 countries we surveyed is 4.9% and, according to the World Population Review, 4.8%.

The above estimates apply to the total population. However, our research only covered the population aged 18–75. We know that the Muslim population in Europe is significantly younger than the non-Muslim population.²⁶ Muslims have a much higher proportion of 0–18-year-olds than non-Muslims. Thus, the

samples we use must necessarily contain a smaller proportion of Muslims than the proportions in demographic estimates shown.

It is a general international experience that interview-based sociological surveys have little or no access to people living in closed ethnic, religious and linguistic communities. Not all European Muslims live in such closed communities, but some certainly do. This factor also necessarily reduced the proportion of Muslims included in the sample used for our research.

Table 4: Proportion of Muslim respondents in the research sample

Austria	3.6%
Belgium	4.3%
Czech Republic	-
France	8.5%
Germany	4.6%
Greece	1.5%
Hungary	-
Italy	1.7%
Latvia	-
Netherlands	4.0%
Poland	-
Romania	-
Slovakia	-
Spain	1.9%
Sweden	4.4%
United Kingdom	6.5%
Total	3.4%

Of the 16 European countries we examined, 10 have a significant Muslim population. In the sample used for our research, we also met Muslim respondents in all 10. Although in some countries (UK, France), the proportion of respondents in the sample is close to the estimates based on demographic calculations, the low number of cases does not allow for a country-by-country analysis. Therefore, we grouped the sample of Muslim respondents, regardless

of the country in which they live.

In the population-weighted, total sample of 16 countries, representing the population aged 18–75, a total of 3.4% were Muslim respondents, which is not far from the demographically estimated proportion of the total Muslim population (4.9%). This group is large enough to examine, in our analysis, the intensity of antisemitism among Muslims in Europe, comparing it with trends measured among the non-Muslim population.²⁷


²⁶ Hackett (2017): "Muslims are much younger and have more children than other Europeans. In 2016, the median age of Muslims throughout Europe was 30.4, 13 years younger than the median for other Europeans (43.8). Looking at it another way, 50% of all European Muslims are under the age of 30, compared with 32% of non-Muslims in Europe."

²⁷ When we write here and in the following about "Muslims living in Europe" or "European Muslims", this means only Muslims living in the countries studied. Muslims living in the Balkans (Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia) and Muslims in the European part of Turkey are therefore excluded.

Respondents were considered Muslim who declared themselves to be Muslim on our denominational question, defined their ethnicity as related to Islam (e.g., Arab, Persian, Turkish, etc.) or were born in African or Asian countries that are clearly considered to have large Muslim populations. Of the latter two groups, of course, we excluded those who declared themselves to be Christian or another non-Muslim denominational affiliation.

Our analysis indicates that antisemitism is much more intense among the Muslim population in Europe than among the non-Muslim population. While nearly two-thirds (66%) of the non-Muslim population in the countries surveyed were free of antisemitism, this proportion was only 38% in the Muslim population. Almost a quarter of European Muslims (24%) are strongly antisemitic in the primary antisemitism index, while 13% are moderately antisemitic and a further 25% are latent antisemitic.

Primary and latent antisemitism among Muslims and non-Muslims




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It should be noted, however, that in a number of European countries, primary antisemitism was measured by a higher rate of antisemitism than among European Muslims. For example, the proportion of primary antisemites is higher among Greeks (48%), Poles (42%), Hungarians (42%) and Slovaks (39%) than among Muslims. The proportion of primary antisemites detected among Muslims is exactly the same as in Romania (38%). Latent antisemitism of 25% among Muslims is simi-

lar to that in Austria (25%) and Poland (24%).

However, by narrowing our research to antisemitic hostility against Israel, a completely different picture emerges. In the analysed countries, 55% of Muslims have a strong, and an additional 27% have a moderate antisemitic attitude in this dimension. At the same time, only 9% of non-Muslims have a strong and an additional 40% have a moderate antisemitic hostility against Israel in the same countries.

Antisemitic hostility against Israel among Muslims and non-Muslims



In conclusion, European Muslims are characterised by a significantly stronger primary antisemitism than the non-Muslim population. However, primary antisemitism is stronger in Greece and several post-Soviet Eastern European countries than among

European Muslims. With regard to Israel, however, many European Muslims support anti-Jewish views, far more than the proportion of the non-Muslim population in any of the countries studied.


5 INTERNATIONAL SURVEYS ON ANTISEMITISM: A COMPARISON

In this chapter, the results of our research are compared with the results of some recent studies on the same subject.

On October 15, 2019, the PEW Research Center published the results of an international attitude survey conducted in the spring of 2019.²⁸ In this context, favourable

or unfavourable opinions about Jews were measured with a single question.²⁹ Twelve countries were included in both our research and PEW Research. The results reported by PEW for these countries are shown in the figure below.³⁰

Percentage who have a ... opinion of Jews in their country
(Pew Research 2019)



28 Pew (2019) Pew Research Center, October, 2019, "European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism" <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/10/Pew-Research-Center-Value-of-Europe-report-FINAL-UP-DATED.pdf>

29 Question 48a.; Spring 2019 PEW Global Attitudes Survey

30 Pew (2019) Page 85.; Direct access to data:


https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/minority-groups/pg_10-15-19-europe-values-06-05/

The following figure compares the results of our research and Pew Research. Strong affective antisemitism is conceptually the closest to the question posed by the Pew Research Center in our research, so we use this for comparison. The specific numbers in the two studies certainly differ due to radically

different questionnaires, fieldwork techniques, methods and many other reasons. However, the results of the two studies are quite similar: the ranking and relative position of the countries in both studies are essentially the same.³¹

Primary antisemitism and latent antisemitism in the 16 countries

Strong affective antisemitism



31 In the figure, the dashed line indicates the hypothetical situation where the points would have to be located if the two studies' results had been exactly the same. You can see that the points are quite close to this line.

The New York-based Anti-Defamation League (ADL), with the support of Anzalone Liszt Grove Research (ALG Research)³², has developed an index called “ADL Global 100: An Index of Antisemitism”.³³

This index uses 11 questions for which only “probably true” or “probably false” answers can be given. According to the ADL methodology, an antisemite will give a “probably true” answer to six of the 11 questions.³⁴ Data collection is carried out on samples of 500 people per country by telephone survey. Interviews were conducted in 2014, 2015, 2017 and 2019 in roughly 100 countries around

the world, but not all countries were surveyed each year. There are places where the last measurement was made in 2014 (Czech Republic) and places where four measurements have taken place since 2014 (France, Germany), while in Slovakia, ADL has not yet made any measurements.

The table below summarizes the results of “ADL Global 100” in the 16 countries we studied.³⁵ As ADL data sometimes vary significantly from country to country, therefore the measurements performed so far have been averaged by country.

Table 5: Antisemitism measured by the “ADL Global 100: An Index of Antisemitism” in the 16 countries we examined

	ADL Global 100 2014	ADL Global 100 2015	ADL Global 100 2017	ADL Global 100 2019	ADL Global 100 average 2014-2019
Austria	28%			20%	24%
Belgium	27%	21%		24%	24%
Czech Republic	23%				23%
France	27%	17%	14%	17%	19%
Germany	27%	16%	11%	15%	17%
Greece	69%	67%			68%
Hungary	41%	40%		42%	41%
Italy	20%	29%		18%	22%
Latvia	28%	28%			28%
Netherlands	5%	11%		10%	9%
Poland	45%	37%		48%	43%
Romania	35%	47%			41%
Slovakia					
Spain	29%	29%		28%	29%
Sweden	4%			4%	4%
United Kingdom	8%	12%	10%	11%	10%

³² <https://algpolling.com/>

³³ See: <https://www.adl.org/adl-global-100>

³⁴ See: <https://global100.adl.org/about/global100>

The 11 questions used:

Jews are more loyal to Israel than to [this country/the countries they live in]

Jews have too much power in international financial markets

Jews have too much control over global affairs

Jews think they are better than other people

Jews have too much control over the global media

Jews are responsible for most of the world's wars

Jews have too much power in the business world

Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind

People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave

Jews have too much control over the United States government


Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust

Note that 6 of the 11 questions relate to the excessive international influence of Jews. Therefore, the Jewish world conspiracy aspect of antisemitic prejudice is quite overweighted in this index.

³⁵ Source of data: <https://global100.adl.org/about/global100>

The following figure compares the averages of country results measured by ADL Global 100 with the results of our research.³⁶

Integrated manifest antisemitism



Although the specific numbers of the two studies are different, the overall picture is clearly the same. In both studies, the same countries are in the group of strongly antisemitic, in the middle and those less affected by antisemitism.

The Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, which operates

within the framework of The Lester and Sally Entin Faculty of Humanities at Tel Aviv University, takes a different approach to the topic from the approaches presented so far. The Kantor Center regularly publishes its annual reports entitled “Antisemitism Worldwide”.

³⁶ In the figure, the dashed line indicates the hypothetical situation where the points would have to be located if the two studies' results had been exactly the same. It can be seen that the points are quite close to this line, with the exception of Greece, where the ADL method showed much stronger antisemitism than the method we used, although Greece is also the most antisemitic country in terms of manifest antisemitism. It is also clear that the ADL method shows a slightly higher proportion of antisemites in most countries than the method we used.

These quite thorough and detailed reports in many countries around the world take into account the violent incidents against Jews and Judaism.³⁷ The reports describe and analyse the number of atrocities and major violent incidents against Jewish individuals, Jewish institutions and Jewish memorials broken down by country. The following table shows, for the 16 countries we examined, how many serious acts of violence occurred in each country according to the Kantor Center's reports for 2018 and 2019.

Table 6: Major violent incidents registered by the Kantor Center in 2018-2019 in the 16 countries we examined

	Major violent incidents in 2018 ³⁸	Major violent incidents in 2019 ³⁹	Major violent incidents altogether 2018-2019
Austria	2	3	5
Belgium	19	6	25
Czech Republic	2	2	4
France	35	41	76
Germany	35	41	76
Greece	7	6	13
Hungary	3	2	5
Italy	2	3	5
Latvia			0
Netherlands	15	5	20
Poland	9	11	20
Romania	2	1	3
Slovakia	0	1	1
Spain	1	3	4
Sweden	4	5	9
UK	68	122	190


³⁷ See: https://en-humanities.tau.ac.il/kantor/research/annual_reports

³⁸ See: https://en-humanities.tau.ac.il/sites/humanities_en.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/humanities/kantor/Antisemitism%20Worldwide%202018.pdf

³⁹ See: https://en-humanities.tau.ac.il/sites/humanities_en.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/humanities/kantor/Kantor%20Center%20Worldwide%20Antisemitism%20in%202019%20-%20Main%20findings.pdf

The figure below compares the number of antisemitic prejudice we measured in each serious violent acts detected by the Kantor Center in 2018 and 2019 with the degree of

Integrated manifest antisemitism (%)



As the figure clearly shows, the number of violent acts and the degree of anti-Jewish prejudice are essentially unrelated. In many countries where antisemitic prejudice is strong, not only according to our study but also in other antisemitism research, anti-Jewish violence is rare. In contrast, many acts of violence, attacks and abuse occur in

countries where all research suggests that the proportion of those who nurture anti-Jewish prejudice is low, such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany.

We noted in the introduction that according to theories on prejudices, prejudice research is not suitable to forecast the probability of violent acts. Our results and data

from international surveys help us establish that the relation between the intensity of antisemitic prejudice and the frequency of violent, antisemitic acts is weak. Therefore, we are unable to draw conclusion the extent of antisemitic prejudice from the number of antisemitic acts of violence. Also, data available on the extent of antisemitic prejudice is a poor indicator of the frequency of violent antisemitic acts.

From these data, it seems that the number of violent acts is mostly high in countries with a higher proportion of Muslims in their population. Though the proportion of antisemites among the Muslims is significantly higher than among the non-Muslims, the proportion of Muslims in the country does not explain the observed number of violent anti-Jewish acts since we can also see that, for example, in Poland, where practically no Muslims live⁴⁰, the same number of acts of violence have taken place as in the Netherlands, where the 880,000 Muslims living there make up more than 5% of the population. Such acts are also relatively rare in Sweden, Austria, Spain and Italy, where a significant Muslim population lives.⁴¹

The frequency of violent acts obviously has a strong impact on the sense of security, well-being and quality of life of Jews in a given country, as well as on how strong antisemitism is perceived in that country. Regular research among European Jews by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) provides feedback on the well-being and perception of reality of Jews living in European countries.⁴² Their results and theoretical lessons were most recently summarised by Sergio DellaPergola.⁴³ One of the main conclusions of his study is suitable to explain the correlations we also

observed.

According to DellaPergola, there is only an indirect correlation between the intensity and change of antisemitic prejudice and the strength perceived by those affected, the Jews. The perceived antisemitism is influenced not only by the long-term historical factors of the respective countries, but also by other factors such as the rate of immigration and the proportion of immigrants living in the country, especially the Islamic population.⁴⁴ However, the biggest impact is the spread of modern means of communication – the internet. “The resonance and impact of antisemitic discourse and its perceptions by Jews have been enormously magnified by the communication networks inherent in globalization and transnational processes.⁴⁵ [...] Antisemitism perceptions reflect, in fact, the multiplier of the number of perpetrators of a given act or expression by the number of people exposed to it. The absolute number or relative percentage of perpetrators within a given population may have actually remained very constant – as several studies, indeed, suggest. As a result of the more effective communication of those involved, however, the public impact of antisemitism actually may have increased [...] the perceptual impact of antisemitism could derive primarily from items experienced personally, whereas nowadays, it becomes the cumulative impact of experiences shared by all those who are interconnected through the web. Here one probably finds the solution to the noted inconsistency between a relatively static perception of antisemitism as unveiled by repeated surveys of the total population and the pressing perceptions of growing antisemitism as expressed by the overwhelming majority of European Jews.”⁴⁶

40 There are less than 7,000 Muslims in Poland, representing 0.02% of the population

Source: World Population Review - Muslim Population By Country 2020
<https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/muslim-population-by-country/>

41 World Population Review - Muslim Population By Country 2020

<https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/muslim-population-by-country/>

42 See: FRA (2018), Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU, Luxembourg, EU Publications Office.

https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf

43 DellaPergola (2019) Sergio DellaPergola, Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look;

Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism - ACTA Volume 40 (2019): Issue 2 (March 2019)

<https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/actap/40/2/article-20202001.xml>

44 DellaPergola (2019) p.67

45 DellaPergola (2019) p.3

46 DellaPergola (2019) p.75

6 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

We used the so-called logistic regression modelling, which explains a target variable (in this case primary antisemitism) by simultaneously analysing a number of demographic, social-psychological, social, political and other factors, taking into account their interrelationships.

Earlier, we described the method of causal analysis and the explanatory variables used

in the analysis.⁴⁷ At the end of each country report (see volume 2), we also presented the results of the logistic regression analysis in each country. Here, we now review these results together and by comparing the countries studied. The table below summarises the results of the logistic regression analysis in the 16 countries.

Table 7: Results of logistic regression analysis in the 16 countries studied

	Nagelkerke R square	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)										
		Law and Order conservatism	Distrust in politics	Populism	Xenophobia	Nationalism	Religiosity	Subjective deprivation	Social status (ESOMAR)	Age groups	Size of settlement	Left-right political self-classification
Austria	0.372	1.255	0.732	1.765	11.113	1.478	1.224	0.938	1.795	1.495	1.547	2.824
Belgium	0.263	1.637	1.440	0.978	9.694	1.780	0.707	0.830	1.747	0.849	0.514	1.085
Czech Rep.	0.251	2.644	0.573	2.066	5.753	0.519	0.664	0.841	1.523	0.796	1.438	0.822
France	0.224	7.142	0.835	1.907	2.620	1.016	0.686	1.325	1.425	0.932	1.111	1.402
Germany	0.209	2.671	1.635	1.943	3.395	1.550	0.603	1.225	0.545	1.503	1.686	2.653
Greece	0.390	2.181	0.735	3.204	10.570	1.207	0.891	1.348	0.829	1.364	1.642	1.283
Hungary	0.393	2.049	0.643	2.302	14.200	1.332	0.963	1.576	1.423	0.743	1.089	2.335
Italy	0.404	3.882	0.384	0.458	26.274	0.685	0.383	0.997	5.054	1.433	0.624	1.354
Latvia	0.205	1.017	1.203	1.143	10.308	0.981	0.860	0.672	1.761	1.014	3.177	1.101
Netherlands	0.141	3.600	1.468	1.543	2.053	0.628	0.640	0.260	3.439	1.428	0.793	1.020
Poland	0.377	1.475	0.652	1.108	12.574	1.735	1.814	0.721	1.313	1.189	0.715	1.984
Romania	0.213	1.059	0.583	0.941	5.295	0.971	1.186	0.646	2.405	0.905	0.852	1.236
Slovakia	0.350	2.473	1.044	1.400	14.861	0.901	0.969	0.839	1.116	1.013	0.537	0.538
Spain	0.256	1.346	0.613	1.495	6.308	1.118	1.537	0.600	2.160	1.190	0.978	0.827
Sweden	0.219	1.496	1.047	3.133	19.726	1.921	1.034	1.913	1.172	0.589	1.161	1.181
UK	0.179	1.457	0.580	5.984	8.670	0.669	1.408	0.672	1.369	0.870	2.550	0.959

⁴⁷ See chapter 2.7

In the table above, we marked in bold and orange the odds ratios that significantly determined in a given country whether a person is a primary antisemite or not.⁴⁸

What is immediately striking is that attitudinal explanatory variables determine antisemitism with higher probability and in more countries than demographic variables (age, settlement size).

Xenophobia had a significant impact on antisemitism in all countries except the Netherlands. Moreover, in the vast majority of countries, xenophobia has had by far the strongest impact on whether or not someone is antisemitic. This varies from country to country, but those characterised by xenophobia are at least 2.5 times more likely to be antisemitic than one who does not belong to this group. In seven countries, this difference was 10 times or more.

These data indicate that antisemitism is largely a manifestation and consequence of resentment, distancing and rejection towards a generalised stranger. Thus, its future development is likely to be greatly influenced by changes in xenophobic attitudes in general.

Xenophobia played a smaller role in two countries – the Netherlands and France – than elsewhere. In the Netherlands, where the explanatory force of the model was the lowest anyway, xenophobia is not significantly associated with antisemitism, although xenophobes are also twice as likely to be antisemitic as others. Although the effect of xenophobia proved to be significant in France, Law and Order conservatism had a stronger explanatory power here than xenophobia.

Law and Order conservatism was significantly associated with antisemitism in nine countries. It can be assumed that this attitude may play a role in generating traditional antisemitism, as many studies have shown. Law and Order conservatism can be driven by factors such as (old) age and settlement type, as shown in the table above, for example, in Austria, Germany, Greece and part-

ly in the Netherlands, where odds ratios for these factors are quite high, but their effects are likely to be indirect. Where this attitude played a significant role, it was 1.5 to 7 as likely that a law-and-order-conservatism respondent was antisemitic than those not characterized by this mindset. It is striking that in the Netherlands, where the variables we use only weakly explain antisemitism, Law and Order conservatism respondents were much more likely to be antisemitic than others, which may indicate one source of antisemitism in the country.

Also, in nine countries, populist attitudes had a significant effect on whether someone was antisemitic or not. This attitude means accepting statements that express anti-elitism, skepticism about parliamentary democracy, and support for grass-roots decision-making, so attitudes that are common in both radical right-wing and radical left-wing camps. In eight countries, populists were at least 1.8 times more likely to be a primary anti-Semite than those who did not share populist views, including the United Kingdom and Sweden, where the proportion of antisemitic groups is the smallest. In these two countries, after xenophobia, populist attitudes are the second most important explanatory factor for the propensity for antisemitism. An interesting exception to the trend here is Italy, where those who hold populist views are only half as likely to be antisemitic as those who do not. This fact is presumably related to the specifics of Italian politics.

Trust in politicians governing the country has had a significant impact on primary antisemitism in seven countries. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain, those who trusted the existing government, the leaders of the country, were significantly more antisemitic than those who could not trust the politicians in power. In Germany, the situation was just the opposite: Respondents were 1.6 times more likely to be primary antisemites if they did not trust the country's leaders.

⁴⁸ The exact levels of significance are reported for each country in the Volume II - Country Reports.

In five countries, left-to-right self-classification on the political spectrum significantly influenced whether someone was antisemitic. In Austria, Germany, Hungary and Poland, those who put themselves on the political right were 2 to 3 times more likely to be primary antisemites than those who put themselves on the left. In Slovakia, on the other hand, the left was roughly twice as likely to be antisemitic. (Left-wing voters are also more antisemitic than right-wing voters in the Czech Republic, Spain and the United Kingdom, but this correlation was not significant in these countries.) The significant impact of political self-classification on antisemitism may also indicate in which countries the political and social discourse on antisemitism is most politicised.

Religiosity played a significant role in explaining antisemitism only in Poland. Here, those who considered themselves religious were 1.8 times more likely to be primary antisemites than non-religious respondents or atheists. Religious people are also more prone to antisemitism in Spain and the United Kingdom, but these correlations are not significant. In the Czech Republic, Germany and Italy, on the other hand, the opposite is true: Religious people are significantly less likely to be antisemitic than those who are non-religious or atheist. This result likely indicates an indirect effect of other factors.

Those who express explicitly nationalist views are 1.7 to 1.8 times more likely to be antisemitic in Belgium and Poland than those who are not characterised by nationalist views. In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, nationalists are roughly half as likely to be antisemites than those who are unaccustomed to nationalism. The odds ratios indicating the relationship between nationalism and prejudice are still relatively high in Sweden, Germany, and Austria, but do not show a direct, significant correlation with antisemitism in these countries.

The results of our study show that the direct impact of demographic and socio-economic indicators on antisemitic prejudice is much smaller than that of socio-psychological factors, worldview and political variables.

Age did not play a very important direct

role in primary antisemitism in any of the countries studied. In Greece and Latvia, those living in smaller settlements are significantly more likely to be antisemitic than those living in larger settlements. However, in Slovakia, antisemites are much more likely to reside in Bratislava, the only major city in the country.

If we look only at the odds ratios, we see that in Austria and Germany, older people and those living in small settlements are more likely to be antisemitic than others. In Greece and the Netherlands, the same is true for age, while the same is true in the United Kingdom in terms of settlement size, but these correlations are not significant and, at most, indirect.

ESOMAR social status has a stronger effect on antisemitic prejudice. This has shown a significant effect on antisemitism in seven countries. In these countries, those with low social status (ESOMAR status groups “D” and “E”) are significantly more likely to be antisemitic than those with high social status (ESOMAR status groups “A” and “B”). The odds ratio between the two groups was more than 5 times higher in Italy and almost 3.5 times higher in the Netherlands; a stronger tendency to antisemitic prejudice was also shown at the lower levels of the social structure in Romania and Spain. It is striking that in the survey, in the most antisemitic societies – Greece, Poland, Slovakia and even Hungary – one’s place in the social hierarchy has no or only a weak effect on prejudice.

We also examined whether feelings of subjective deprivation have an effect on prejudice, namely, whether those who feel disadvantaged compared to others are more antisemitic. According to the results of the analysis, this is most typical for Hungary: Here, those who feel deprived are 1.6 times more likely to be among the primary antisemites than those who consider their social situation to be favourable. In Sweden, this odds ratio is almost double, but here it is not directly significantly related to prejudice. In Romania, on the other hand, deprived people are less antisemitic than those who feel they are among the winners

in life.

The primary model we use to explain manifest antisemitism in most cases sufficiently explains antisemitism. The Nagelkerke R square indicator, which measures the relevance of the model, indicates that the model mostly works best in countries where antisemitism is relatively strong. Based on the explanatory variables we use, it is possible to determine who is antisemitic with a probability of 39% in Greece and Hungary, with a probability of 38% in Poland and Austria, and with a probability of 35% in Slovakia. These proportions are considered high in social science research. (An interesting exception to the observed trend is Italy, a moderately antisemitic country where the explanatory power of the model is 40%.)

The relevance of the model is lowest in countries where antisemitism is also low. Here, we have probably encountered the limitations of quantitative sociological studies. The social sources and determinants of antisemitism are diverse, including historical, political and socio-psychological factors that are difficult to capture through survey research. The content and emotional intensity of antisemitic prejudice is shaped by the specific interaction of quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors, which can lead to different outcomes in specific cases. Data collected by quantitative methods can only provide a partial explanation for cases where the weight of non-quantifiable factors is presumed to be high.

Prejudice research, including antisemitic

prejudice research, has often examined a hypothesis that antisemitism in modern societies can be traced back to a general background cause. According to this, the presence of antisemitism in a modern society indicates the disturbances of modernization, which manifests itself, among other things, in the impediment of socio-economic development. Sergio DellaPergola studied the relationship between socioeconomic development and antisemitism on the assumption that there is a negative correlation between the two factors, "assuming socioeconomic development is associated with institutional arrangements that promote democracy and civil liberties and in various ways tend to moderate the influence of totalitarianism and prejudice."⁴⁹ In his analysis, he examined whether there was a significant correlation between the Human Development Index⁵⁰, a composite indicator of human development developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and antisemitic prejudice measured by the ADL in the countries studied. The study showed that the relationship is close: Development is strongly and negatively related to antisemitism.⁵¹

We also performed a correlation between HDI⁵² and antisemitic prejudice using the results of our survey. In the course of the analysis, we also found a high correlation between the two indicators, which points out that there is a close correlation between the human development of the 16 countries we examined and the manifest and latent antisemitism measured there.


49 DellaPergola (2020) Sergio DellaPergola, Jewish Demography in the European Union - Virtuous and Vicious Paths. In: Haim Fireberg/Olaf Glöckner/Marcela Menachem Zoufalá (eds.), Being Jewish in 21st Century Central Europe, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2020, pp. 17-56.

50 UNDP (2019) United Nations Development Programme - Human Development Report 2019
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf>


51 According to the statistical analysis of DellaPergola, the developmental index explained the measured antisemitism in 30% ($R^2 = 0.306$). The correlation between the two indicators was -0.553 , very high. Sergio DellaPergola, op.cit.

52 There are three key dimensions to the Human Development Index: „Long and healthy life“, „Knowledge“ and „A decent standard of living“, that is, the indicator integrates data on education, living standards and quality of life.

See: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>



Primary and Latent antisemitism



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The dashed line in the figure shows the fitted linear trend: The more developed a European country is, the less its population tends to be characterised by antisemitism. Thus, the degree of modernization and the disruption of modernization processes undoubtedly have a serious impact on the development of antisemitic prejudice.

At the 30% explanatory power ($R^2 = 0.306$) found by DellaPergola in his analysis of ADL research data, we detected a much stronger correlation. Human development, analysed in our data, explains 46% of antisemitism ($R^2 = 0.456$). Correlation values were also found to be higher than in the analysis based on ADL research data.⁵³

The figure also shows which countries above the trend line have stronger antisemitism than can be predicted from their human development, and which countries below the trend line have antisemitic rates

lower than expected from their human development. It is remarkable that the first group mostly includes those countries where we measured strong antisemitism and the explanatory model we used worked well (Poland, Greece and Austria), while the second group tends to include those where antisemitism proved to be moderate and the model's explanatory power was also weaker (Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Latvia).

It can be stated that modernisation and human development indicators can amplify or weaken factors that then influence the development of antisemitic prejudice. At the same time, the data also indicate that antisemitism is more than half influenced by factors that cannot be directly related to modernisation and human development processes.

⁵³ The Pearson's correlation coefficient between HDI and antisemitism was -0.675, and the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient was -0.698.

7 APPENDIX

7.1 METHOD OF RESEARCH

Action and Protection League’s antisemitism research was conducted in 16 European countries with a standard questionnaire among the European population aged 18–75 in December 2019 and January 2020.

In France, due to technical problems, the data collection had to be repeated. There, repeated data collection started in early February 2020, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the survey had to be stopped in mid-March 2020 and then resumed two months later. Data collection in France ended in mid-June 2020.

Countries studied in the research: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

The fieldwork of the research was coordinated by Ipsos Hungary and carried out by the international network of Ipsos SA and the local fieldwork companies requested by

Ipsos. The data were processed and analysed with the coordination of Inspira Hungary, under the direction of András Kovács and György Fischer.

The research was carried out uniformly in all 16 countries via face-to-face interviews, standard questionnaires, CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing) and TAPI (Tablet Assisted Personal Interviewing).

The sample size was 1,000 people per country, so the total database of the research contains a total of 16,000 cases.

The margin of sampling error of 16,000 items with 95% probability is less than +0.77%. The margin of sampling error for 1000-item samples from each country is less than +3.2% with a 95% probability. If the samples are divided into smaller groups and segments in different respects during the analysis, the margin of sampling error for these segments can be larger than these values.

7.1.1 TRANSLATION OF QUESTIONNAIRES

The so-called Master questionnaire was prepared in English. During the development and translation of the different language versions, we used the so-called “translator team” solution. The language versions of the English Master Questionnaire were translated completely independently by two professional native translators experienced in questionnaire translations.

The independent translations were com-

pared by two translators and a third supervisor (also a professional native translator with research experience) in a workshop to find the most suitable and appropriate language solutions.

If necessary, the translation teams were also asked for interpretation assistance from the central team in charge of the research.

A total of 18 different language versions of the questionnaire were generated. Some

of the countries surveyed share one or more languages with other countries, such as Belgium or Austria. There were also national translation teams in these countries. This was necessary because there are sometimes significant cultural and linguistic differences between countries that share a language. In Belgium, a questionnaire was also writ-

ten in Walloon and Flemish. These were not identical to the questionnaires used in France and the Netherlands. The questionnaires used in Germany and Austria were not completely identical either. In Latvia, we also used Latvian and Russian language questionnaires.

7.1.2 SAMPLING

The samples were developed by local fieldwork companies under the guidance of the central coordination team. Sampling was performed in all 16 countries using a multi-stage, proportionally stratified random sampling procedure.

In the first sampling phase, a stratum was formed by combining settlement size categories and regions. These strata can be considered as separate subpopulations. The sample size per layer was determined in proportion to the size of the given stratum within the population. Primary sampling units were selected accordingly in each stratum. This was the first step in sampling.

The final sampling units are the population of the appropriate age and gender in the second stage of selection. In the second sampling step, the respondents were selected using basically two methods.

In the first so-called random walk with quota sampling technique, the interviewer him/herself is a participant in the sample

preparation. Where such a solution was used, the respondents were selected by the interviewers in accordance with the so-called “roaming instructions”, quotas and procedural instructions for selection from household members.

In the other procedure, the so-called address card method, when the interviewer does not visit the household to be interviewed by random walk but visits specific and clearly defined addresses or persons.

In Austria and Italy, as the data were collected in the framework of the Omnibus survey, the sample reflects the corresponding proportions of the total population for the population over 18 years of age (without an upper age limit).

The composition of the samples according to gender ratio, age groups, geographical regionality, and settlement size in each country reflects the composition of the population aged 18-75 in that country.

Table 8: Key sampling information

	Age limit	n	Number of PSU ⁵⁴	Demographic factors considered in the sampling	Method of selecting the target person
Austria	18+	1000 (18-75 years n=923)	221	gender age group 9 regions (NUTS-2) ⁵⁵ settlement size education economic activity	random walk with quota
Belgium	18-75	1000	308	gender age 11 regions (NUTS-2) settlement size	random walk with quota
Czech Republic	18-75	1000	175	gender age group 8 regions (NUTS-2) settlement size	random walk with quota
France	18-75	1000	233	gender age group 5 regions settlement size	random walk with quota
Germany	18-75	1000	258	gender age 16 regions (Bundesländer – NUTS-1) settlement size (BIK) ⁵⁶	random walk with quota
Greece	18-75	1000	125	gender age group 13 regions (NUTS-2) settlement size	random walk with quota
Hungary	18-75	1000	106	gender age group 7 regions (NUTS-2) settlement size	random walk with quota
Italy	18+	1000 (18-75 years n=902)	140	gender age group 5 regions (NUTS-1) settlement size	address card
Latvia	18-75	1000	104	gender age group 6 regions (NUTS-3) settlement size	address card
Netherlands	18-75	1000	114	gender age group 12 regions (NUTS-2) settlement size	random walk with quota

54 PSU = Primary Sampling Unit, which shows at how many different sites the research took place

55 NUTS = (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) the European Union's territorial statistical classification system, which consists of three hierarchical levels

<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background>

56 BIK = a widespread German regional and settlement pattern classification system (BIK Siedlungsstrukturtypen)

<https://www.bik-gmbh.de/cms/regionaldaten/bik-regionen>

	Age limit	n	Number of PSU ⁵⁴	Demographic factors considered in the sampling	Method of selecting the target person
Poland	18-75	1000	203	gender age group 17 regions (NUTS-2) settlement size	address card
Romania	18-75	1000	83	gender age group 8 regions (NUTS-2) settlement size	random walk with quota
Slovakia	18-75	1000	100	gender age group 4 regions (NUTS-2) settlement size	random walk with quota
Spain	18-75	1000	62	gender age group 7 regions (NUTS-1) settlement size	random walk with quota
Sweden	18-75	1000	245	gender age group 8 regions (NUTS-2) settlement size	address card
United Kingdom	18-75	1000	191	gender age group 12 regions (NUTS-1) set- tlement size economic activity home use title	address card

7.1.3 FIELDWORK

The research was carried out in all countries except France between the beginning of December 2019 and the end of January 2020.

In all countries, interviewees were questioned in person at the respondent's home.⁵⁷

Interviewers in all 16 countries participated in a preparation specifically for this research. Following the English-language central training of the central co-ordination team, one part of the interviewers attended a

personal project kick-off meeting and another took part in a telephone briefing. A detailed written description for each contributor has also been provided. In addition, they were introduced to the CAPI interface by conducting test interviews so that they could already ask questions with complete confidence in the field.

⁵⁷ In Sweden, due to the telephone pre-organisation, the interview took place in a suitable agreed-upon location for the respondent in the given municipality, most were typically in their home.

Table 9: Key information on fieldwork

	Type of field-work	Tool for questioning	Number of interviewers participating in the research	Duration of fieldwork
Austria	Omnibus	TAPI (Tablet)	59	27 days
Belgium	Independent research	TAPI (Tablet)	64	68 days
Czech Republic	Independent research	CAPI (Laptop)	80	34 days
France	Independent research	TAPI (Tablet)	98	20 days (With an interruption of 2 months due to the COVID19 pandemic)
Germany	Omnibus	CAPI (Laptop)	199	19 days
Greece	Omnibus	CAPI (Laptop)	45	30 days
Hungary	Independent research	CAPI (Laptop)	84	35 days
Italy	Omnibus	CAPI (Laptop)	88	14 days
Latvia	Independent research	CAPI (Laptop)	29	27 days
Netherlands	Independent research	CAPI (Laptop)	133	29 days
Poland	Independent research	TAPI (Tablet)	127	14 days
Romania	Independent research	TAPI (Tablet)	63	21 days
Slovakia	Independent research	CAPI (Laptop)	75	34 days
Spain	Independent research	TAPI (Tablet)	45	26 days
Sweden	Independent research	CAPI (Laptop)	45	37 days
United Kingdom	Omnibus	CAPI (Laptop)	191	21 days

7.1.4 QUALITY CONTROL

The quality control of the completed interviews was performed primarily by checking the time codes and GPS geographic codes recorded by digital computing devices. In addition, we checked the interviews by calling the respondents back by phone, contacting them by e-mail or post, and listening back to digital audio recordings.

Errors that could be fixed were improved. If there was any doubt as to whether the interviewer had acted properly, all interviews of the given interviewer were reviewed, and in the case of an error, the recorded interviews were deleted from the database and re-interviewed at a new address.

Table 10: Key information on quality control

	Method of checking	Proportion of verified interviews
Austria	call-back	11%
Belgium	call-back	10%
Czech Republic	digital audio recording playback	70%
France	call-back and email inquiry	12%
Germany	postal inquiry	10%
Greece	call-back	17.5%
Hungary	digital audio recording playback ⁵⁸ and call-back	100% digital 10.2% call-back
Italy	call-back	11%
Latvia	call-back	11.3%
Netherlands	call-back	12.4%
Poland	digital control system ⁵⁹ and call-back	100% digital 25% call-back
Romania	digital audio recording playback and call-back	25% digital 40% call-back
Slovakia	digital audio recording playback	70%
Spain	call-back	11.6%
Sweden	call-back	14%
United Kingdom	call-back	20.7%

58 At the pre-specified points of the questionnaire (at the beginning, middle and end), an audio recording was made of each interview, which was 100% listened to by checkers.

59 This system monitors the following:

- 1) The length of the interview is less than 10 minutes and more than 90 minutes
- 2) The time between the two interviews is less than 5 minutes
- 3) Too many interviews per day by the same interviewer - more than 5
- 4) During the interviews, a higher than average rate of "do not know" / "non-response" answers.
- 5) Interviews are conducted before 8:00 or after 22:00
- 6) Interviews that begin and end on different days
- 7) If the first code is chosen too many times during the interview

7.1.5 WEIGHTING

During the fieldwork, there may inevitably be minor or major distortions in the applied sample, i.e., the distributions of the realized sample may differ from the population distributions established on the basis of official statistics. Minor distortions of the sample that inevitably occur during fieldwork were corrected for each country via data from local statistical institutes using a multi-point weighting procedure.

As the statistical systems of the individual countries and these available data sources do not publish the cross-correlations of the population distributions in a uniform structure, we could not apply completely equal weighting criteria in the 16 countries.

After weighting the samples, the population of the countries aged 18-75 was represented in all countries studied by gender ratio, age group and geographic regional. In

most countries, in addition to these, we also measured by settlement size and educational attainment.⁶⁰

In each case, our goal was for the weighted sample to follow the population distribution according to the given variables, and for the cross-tables made from the sample to give the same distribution back as the available population cross-tables.

The weighting procedure was iteration cell weighting for each country.

In addition to the case-counting weights, we also formed projection weights by country with a linear transformation, which projected the distributions to the represented population of the given country.

Using these weights, population numbers for the total represented population belonging to a given population can also be detected.

Table 11: Key weighting information

	Factors considered in the weighting	Number of weighted cells	Source of population data used for weighting and date of statistical survey	Maximum weight used
Austria	gender age group settlement size education	563	"STATcube" Statistical Database of Statistik Austria 2017	4.3802
Belgium	gender age group region	128	StatBel - Statistics Belgium 2016	8.6664
Czech Republic	gender age group, region, settlement size education	664	Český Statistický Úřad Cenzus 2011	1.3821
France	gender, age group, region, settlement size, education	619	Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) 2018	6.1023
	Factors considered in the weighting	Number of weighted cells	Source of population data used for weighting and date of statistical survey	Maximum weight used

54 PSU = Primary Sampling Unit, which shows at how many different sites the research took place

55 NUTS = (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) the European Union's territorial statistical classification system, which consists of three hierarchical levels

<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background>

56 BIK = a widespread German regional and settlement pattern classification system (BIK Siedlungsstrukturtypen)

<https://www.bik-gmbh.de/cms/regionaldaten/bik-regionen>

Germany	gender age group region, settlement type, (BIK Institute's urban-re- gion scheme)	646	Media Analyse Intermedia ⁶² 2018	2.8983
Greece	gender age group education	64	Ελληνική Στατιστική Αρχή (Hellenic Statistical Authority) Cenzus 2011	7.5818
Hungary	gender age group education settlement type	204	Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) Census 2011	6.8516
Italy	gender age group region	60	Istituto Nazionale di Statistica Stime Popolazione 2018	4.6109
Latvia	gender age group settlement size education	448	Centrālā statistikas parvāde (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia) 2019	2.9666
Netherlands	gender age group education	63	Gouden Standaard ⁶³ 2018	7.9791
Poland	gender age group settlement size	69	Główny Urząd Statystyczny (Statistics Poland) Census 2011	4.3377
Romania	gender age group region settlement size	334	Institutul Național de Statistic Census 2011	4.0267
Slovakia	gender age group region settlement size edu- cation	502	Štatistický Úrad Slovenskej Republiky Census 2011	1.5972
Spain	gender age group settlement size	95	Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) Census 2011	2.4809
Sweden	gender age group settlement size education	273	SCB - Statistics Sweden 2018	9.5795
United Kingdom	gender age group region settlement size education	712	UK Statistics Authority 2019	4.7725

62 The product of Intermedia PLuS az Arbeitsgemeinschaft Media-Analyse e.V. (agma), which presents the media use of the German population in large-scale research. <https://www.agma-mmc.de/media-analyse/ma-intermedia-plus>

63 Gouden Standaard (Gold Standard) is a statistical database for sample preparation, compiled by the Dutch Market Research Association (MOA) in collaboration with the Dutch National Bureau of Statistics (CBS). <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/maatwerk/2020/05/gouden-standaard-2018>

7.2 FACTOR SCORES ON FIRST UNROTATED PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS

Factor scores of the 10 “Cognitive Antisemitism” statements on the first unrotated principal component

Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals.	.822
It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews.	.815
It would be best if Jews left this country.	.805
It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations.	.797
Jews have too much influence in this country.	.765
Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society.	.762
The interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population.	.751
There is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world.	.713
Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews.	.706
The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God.	.684

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Factor scores of the 7 “Secondary Antisemitism” statements on the first unrotated principal component

Many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later.	.831
Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust.	.801
Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes.	.782
The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed.	.769
Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them.	.767
After so many decades have passed since the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda.	.741
We must keep the memory of the persecution of the Jews alive.	-.521

Factor scores of 4 “Antisemitic Hostility against Israel “ statements on the first unrotated principal component

When I think of Israel's politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews.	.795
Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians.	.780
Because of Israel's politics, I dislike Jews more and more.	.758
The Israeli policy towards the Palestinians justifies an international boycott of Israel.	.716

Factor scores of the 16 “Xenophobia” statements on the first unrotated principal component

Feelings towards – Arabs	.801
Feelings towards - Black Africans /Caribbeans	.794
As your neighbour – Muslim	.793
Feelings towards – Turkish	.786
As your neighbour - Black African	.786
Feelings towards – Migrants	.785
As your neighbour – Turkish	.784
As your neighbour – Migrant	.770
Feelings towards - Roma/Gypsies	.724
As your neighbour - Roma / Gypsy	.693
As your neighbour – Chinese	.681
Feelings towards – Chinese	.674
As your neighbour – Russian	.591
Feelings towards – Russians	.576
As your neighbour – American	.488
Feelings towards – Americans	.476

95

Factor scores of the 3 “Distrust in Politics” statements on the first unrotated principal component

Even if politicians often make mistakes, they are looking out for the good of the people.	.788
The country’s leaders don’t really care about people like me.	.741
People like me can influence the future of this country if they want to.	.518

Factor scores of the 5 “Populism” statements on the first unrotated principal component

Political parties just argue and are not able to solve serious problems facing our country.	.706
It would be better if people could decide directly, for example by referendum, on the most important political issues instead of Parliament deciding.	.692
It’s better if people themselves take action to resolve social injustices, because politicians and parties are generally unable to resolve them.	.687
What politicians call a compromise is in fact giving up principles.	.673
It would be better if a capable and strong leader decided on important issues even if s/he breaks certain rules.	.565

Factor scores of the 6 “Law and Order conservatism” questions on the first unrotated principal component

Do you consider homosexuality immoral or not immoral?	.801
Would you ban abortion - with the exception of some cases, for example rape - or would you not?	.794
Do you think it would be better if religious values played a greater role in raising children or do you not think it would be better?	.793
Would you ban the use of so-called light drugs such as marijuana /cannabis or would you not ban use of such drugs?	.786
Do you think that too much time and energy is spent in public debate on the issue of sexual harassment or do you not think so?	.786
Do you support the death penalty or do you not support it?	.785

7.3 STATEMENT ON ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE: HIGH-SCORING AND LOW-SCORING COUNTRIES

The Top2Box is the combined percentage of "strongly agree" and "agree" responses	Total sample Top2Box	The three highest Top2Box*	The three lowest Top2Box*
Cognitive antisemitism (rated on a 1-5 scale)			
Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews.	13%	GR: 39% RO: 30% HU: 26%	SE: 2% UK: 4% NL: 4%
The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God.	8%	RO: 24% GR: 24% HU: 20%	SE: 1% UK: 3% ES: 3%
There is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world.	21%	GR: 59% HU: 39% SK: 34%	SE: 10% UK: 10% NL: 11%
Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals.	16%	GR: 43% PL: 36% LV: 33%	UK: 3% SE: 4% NL: 6%
Jews have too much influence in this country.	16%	GR: 40% HU: 38% PL: 34%	SE: 3% NL: 5% UK: 6%
Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society.	17%	GR: 36% PL: 35% HU: 31%	SE: 4% UK: 5% ES: 9%
The interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population.	22%	GR: 45% PL: 38% HU: 33%	SE: 5% UK: 8% NL: 10%
It would be best if Jews left this country.	9%	PL: 24% GR: 23% HU: 20%	NL: 1% SE: 1% UK: 2%
It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations.	10%	GR: 29% HU: 26% PL: 22%	SE: 1% NL: 2% UK: 3%
It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews.	18%	GR: 48% PL: 41% HU: 39%	SE: 2% NL: 3% UK: 5%
Secondary antisemitism (rated on a 1-5 scale)			
Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them.	14%	GR: 37% PL: 31% HU: 31%	UK: 2% UK: 4% NL: 5%
The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed.	11%	GR: 23% RO: 22% HU: 20%	NL: 2% SE: 3% UK: 3%
Many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later.	12%	GR: 32% PL: 30% RO: 28%	NL: 2% UK: 3% SE: 4%

The Top2Box is the combined percentage of "strongly agree" and "agree" responses	Total sample Top2Box	The three highest Top2Box*	The three lowest Top2Box*
Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes.	22%	GR: 46% AT: 40% HU: 39%	UK: 8% NL: 11% SE: 12%
Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust.	22%	AT: 42% GR: 42% HU: 41%	UK: 6% SE: 9% NL: 9%
We must keep the memory of the persecution of the Jews alive.	60%	NL: 83% SE: 79% FR: 79%	RO: 39% HU: 43% AT: 45%
After so many decades have passed since the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda.	19%	AT: 43% GR: 40% HU: 38%	SE: 6% UK: 7% FR: 8%
Antisemitic hostility against Israel (rated on a 1-5 scale)			
Because of Israel's politics, I dislike Jews more and more.	15%	AT: 53% GR: 28% PL: 26%	UK: 3% NL: 4% SE: 5%
When I think of Israel's politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews.	26%	GR: 45% AT: 36% NL: 32%	LV: 13% UK: 17% IT: 18%
Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians.	26%	GR: 49% FR: 37% ES: 35%	UK: 13% CZ: 20% LV: 20%
The Israeli policy towards the Palestinians justifies an international boycott of Israel.	25%	GR: 42% AT: 39% PL: 33%	LV: 14% IT: 17% UK: 17%
Sympathy towards Israel (rated on a 1-5 scale)			
Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies.	29%	RO: 47% CZ: 44% LV: 38%	AT: 8% IT: 20% UK: 22%
Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East.	23%	RO: 37% DE: 34% CZ: 34%	UK: 12% BE: 14% ES: 15%
Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism.	35%	DE: 44% RO: 44% CZ: 43%	AT: 23% SE: 24% UK: 26%
Philosemitism (rated on a 1-5 scale)			
I think it is good for a country if many Jews live there.	20%	UK: 29% RO: 27% FR: 24%	SL: 10% NL: 11% AT: 13%
Here in Europe, we should do everything we can to preserve Jewish religion and culture.	38%	NL: 49% UK: 47% DE: 46%	GR: 15% SL: 23% ES: 25%

	Total sample	The three highest	The three lowest
Affective antisemitism			
Do you have negative feelings about the Jews or do you not have such feelings? (Percentage of "rather have negative feelings" answer)	11%	GR: 36% HU: 27% PL: 23%	NL: 2% UK: 3% SE: 3%
We are sometimes more happy with some neighbours and more unhappy with others. How would you feel about having someone from one of the following groups as your neighbour: Jew (Percentage of "totally uncomfortable" and "uncomfortable" answers)	15%	GR: 36% SK: 33% PL: 31%	UK: 4% SE: 4% NL: 4%
Some people have positive feelings for different groups of people, some have negative feelings. Using a scale from 1 to 9, please indicate your feelings towards people from the following group: Jews (Percentage of negative feelings: 1-3 codes on a nine-point scale)	10%	GR: 25% HU: 22% CZ: 21%	NL: 2% SE: 3% UK: 3%

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ISBN 978-615-01-3089-7